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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS
HERBERT HOVENKAMP
CHAPTER 4 (2d)
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM
WALKER PROCESS EQUIP., INC. V. FOOD MACH. & CHEM.
CORP.
382 U.S. 172 (1965)
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the maintenance and enforcement of a
patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and therefore subject to a treble damage
claim by an injured party under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The respondent,
Food Machinery, & Chemical Corp. (hereafter Food Machinery), filed this
suit for infringement of its patent No. 2,328,655 covering knee-action swing
diffusers used in aeration equipment for sewage treatment systems.
Petitioner, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. (hereafter Walker), denied the
infringement and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent
was invalid. After discovery, Food Machinery moved to dismiss its
complaint with prejudice because the patent had expired. Walker then
amended its counterclaim to charge that Food Machinery had ‘illegally
monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad
faith obtaining and maintaining its patent well knowing that it had no basis
for a patent.’ It alleged fraud on the basis that Food Machinery had sworn
before the Patent Office that it neither knew nor believed that its invention
had been in public use in the United States for more than one year prior to
filing its patent application when, in fact, Food Machinery was a party to
prior use within such time. The counterclaim further asserted that the
existence of the patent had deprived Walker of business that it would have
otherwise enjoyed. Walker prayed that Food Machinery's conduct be
declared a violation of the antitrust laws and sought recovery of treble
damages.
… We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by
fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §2 of the Sherman Act
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provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present. In such
event the treble damage provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be
available to an injured party.
As the case reaches us, the allegations of the counterclaim, as to the
fraud practiced upon the Government by Food Machinery as well as the
resulting damage suffered by Walker are taken as true. We, therefore, move
immediately to a consideration of the legal issues presented.
Both Walker and the United States, which appears as amicus curiae,
argue that if Food Machinery obtained its patent by fraud and thereafter
used the patent to exclude Walker from the market through ‘threats of suit’
and prosecution of this infringement suit, such proof would establish a
prima facie violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, Food
Machinery says that a patent monopoly and Sherman Act monopolization
cannot be equated; the removal of the protection of a patent grant because
of fraudulent procurement does not automatically result in a § 2 offense.
Both lower courts seem to have concluded that proof of fraudulent
procurement may be used to bar recovery for infringement, Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S.
806 (1945), but not to establish invalidity. As the Court of Appeals
expressed the proposition, ‘only the government may ‘annul or set aside’ a
patent,' citing Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 (1872). It went on to state
that no case had ‘decided, or hinted that fraud on the Patent Office may be
turned to use in an original affirmative action, instead of as an equitable
defense. Since Walker admits that its anti-trust theory depends on its ability
to prove fraud on the Patent Office, it follows that Walker's second
amended counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
We have concluded, first, that Walker's action is not barred by the rule
that only the United States may sue to cancel or annul a patent. It is true that
there is no statutory authority for a private annulment suit and the
invocation of the equitable powers of the court might often subject a
patentee ‘to innumerable vexatious suits to set aside his patent.’ Mowry, 81
U.S. at 441. But neither reason applies here. Walker counterclaimed under
the Clayton Act, not the patent laws. While one of its elements is the
fraudulent procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the
patent's annulment. The gist of Walker's claim is that since Food Machinery
obtained its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited exception to the
prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, but must answer under that section
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and § 4 of the Clayton Act in treble damages to those injured by any
monopolistic action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Nor can the
interest in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable vexatious suits' be used
to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws. It must be
remembered that we deal only with a special class of patents, i.e., those
procured by intentional fraud.
Under the decisions of this Court a person sued for infringement may
challenge the validity of the patent on various grounds, including fraudulent
procurement. E.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). In fact, one need not await the filing of
a threatened suit by the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964 ed.). At the
same time, we have recognized that an injured party may attack the misuse
of patent rights. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944). To permit recovery of treble damages for the
fraudulent procurement of the patent coupled with violations of § 2 accords
with these long-recognized procedures. It would also promote the purposes
so well expressed in Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816:
‘A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. ]It] is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest
in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from
fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope.’
Walker's counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery obtained the patent
by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office. Proof
of this assertion would be sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its
exemption from the antitrust laws. By the same token, Food Machinery's
good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an honest
mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability-so-called
‘technical fraud.’
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or
commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to
appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the
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relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that
market, there is no way to measure Food Machinery's ability to lessen or
destroy competition. It may be that the device-knee-action swing diffusers used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a relevant market.
There may be effective substitutes for the device, which do not infringe the
patent. This is a matter of proof, as is the amount of damages suffered by
Walker.
As respondent points out, Walker has not clearly articulated its claim. It
appears to be based on a concept of per se illegality under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. But in these circumstances, the issue is premature. As the
Court summarized in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963), the area of per se illegality is carefully limited. We are reluctant to
extend it on the bare pleadings and absent examination of market effect and
economic consequences.
However, even though the per se claim fails at this stage of litigation, we
believe that the case should be remanded for Walker to clarify the asserted
violations of § 2 and to offer proof thereon. The trial court dismissed its suit
not because Walker failed to allege the relevant market, the dominance of
the patented device therein, and the injurious consequences to Walker of the
patent's enforcement, but rather on the ground that the United States alone
may ‘annul or set aside’ a patent for fraud in procurement. The trial court
has not analyzed any economic data. Indeed, no such proof has yet been
offered because of the disposition below. In view of these considerations, as
well as the novelty of the claim asserted and the paucity of guidelines
available in the decided cases, this deficiency cannot be deemed crucial.
Fairness requires that on remand Walker have the opportunity to make its §
2 claims more specific, to prove the alleged fraud, and to establish the
necessary elements of the asserted § 2 violation.
Reversed and remanded.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Consider the pre-trial events that transpired in Walker Process.
Originally, Food Machinery filed suit for infringement of its patent against
Walker Process, who in turn denied infringement and counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. Once Food Machinery
discovered its patent had expired, it moved to dismiss its complaint against
Walker Process with prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice means that Food
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Machinery would not again be able to claim Walker Process infringed on
this specific patent. Moreover, since Food Machinery’s patent had expired,
Walker Process was able to use the patent’s technology free of charge. If
Food Machinery was in fact estopped from bringing any additional
infringement claims for this patent, why would Walker Process continue
with its inequitable conduct coutnerclaim suit? Was Walker Process
actually trying to invalidate the expired patent because it believe Food
Machinery had ‘illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by
fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining its patent well
knowing that it had no basis for a patent,’ or do you think there was some
other motive behind the suit
2. In order to make out an antitrust claim for monopolization by seeking to
enforce a bad patent one must also meet the structural requirements for the
monopolization or attempt to monopolize offense under §2 of the Sherman
Act – namely, market power and proof that the conduct, if likely to run its
course, would maintain or create durable monopoly. Is that likely to happen
when the patent has expired? Of course, “success” occurs when the fraud is
not discovered, something that is much more likely to occur when the defect
in the patent does not appear on the record. Patents that are invalid because
they are anticipated by prior art that the patent applicant neglected to
include in the application present one kind of problem Some prior art
consists of earlier patents, and these are readily available to both a patent
examiner and also to third parties. Other prior art may be much more
difficult to locate – such as publications in obscure journals written in
foreign languages. Much more threatening are omissions that are not on the
public record at all. For example, the “on sale” bar at issue in both Walker
Process and the Dippin’ Dots case, infra, provides that “A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless (b) the invention was … on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application.” 35 U.S.C. § 102.
The problem with prior sales is that they typically do not appear on the
patent application record at all, may be known only to the applicant, and are
discovered by third parties only by luck.
3. In most cases the antitrust challenge to an infringement action is
presented as a counterclaim to the infringement suit itself. If such
counterclaims are classified as “compulsory” they must be brought as
counterclaims or will be barred by principles of res judicata. If, however,
the antitrust counterclaim is permissive, then failure to bring it will not
preclude a subsequent and independent antitrust challenge to the
infringement action. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a):
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A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Most courts find Walker Process style counterclaims to be
compulsory. The Second Circuit’s decision in Critical-Vac
Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intl., Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001), distinguished
between antitrust counterclaims to the infringement suit, which
should be treated as compulsory, from claims and defenses of
patent misuse (see Ch. 7), which might be treated as permissive.
The Supreme Court's controversial decision in Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), had treated the
latter as permissive, and the Second Circuit felt obliged to
reconcile it with emergent doctrine holding that antitrust
counterclaims to infringement actions are best regarded as
compulsory. The second circuit reasoned:
Antitrust claims based on patent misuse, such as the
counterclaims in Mercoid, are likely to involve factual
issues distinct from those involved in patent infringement
litigation between the same parties….In contrast,
antitrust claims based on patent invalidity, such as CVac's claims in the instant case, will generally involve
the same factual issues as those involved in patent
infringement litigation between the same parties….
Is this persuasive? Some misuse claims raise precisely the same issues as
those that arise in an antitrust claim and all necessary facts are known to the
infringement defendant at the time of the infringement suit. For example,
perhaps the infringement plaintiff requires the defendant to use tied, staple
commodities with the patent, and its failure to do so forms the basis for the
infringement claim. In such cases there is no reason not to make the
antitrust counterclaim compulsory. In other cases—such as when the patent
is procured by fraud but the facts are not revealed until after the
infringement suit has run its course—justice is poorly served by a rule that
prevents a subsequent antitrust challenge.
When the facts supporting the antitrust counterclaim are the same as
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those supporting the infringement defense, a compulsory counterclaim rule
economizes on judicial resources and tends toward the efficient resolution
of disputes. For example, if the defense is that the theory of infringement is
legally frivolous, the patent is clearly invalid or has expired, or the
defendant's technology is obviously not infringing, then many of the facts
necessary to support the antitrust counterclaim are implicit in the defense
itself. Other facts, such as market power or the dangerous probability of
success in achieving it can be developed through discovery.
Making antitrust counterclaims compulsory is less sensible,
however, when the facts needed to support the counterclaim are not
sufficiently known at the time the infringement action is brought. In such
cases a compulsory counterclaim rule requires the infringement defendant
to bring an antitrust claim that would be treated as unfounded or even
frivolous if brought through the usual process. The outcome is particularly
serious if the facts needed to support the antitrust counterclaim are not
known until after the filing deadline for counterclaims has passed or, worse
yet, after the trial is over. Evidence about prior sales, as in Walker Process,
is not on the record and might be discovered only after the infringement suit
is complete.
4. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which antedates Walker Process,
"[a] party who petitions the government for redress generally is immune
from antitrust liability." Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119,
122 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 (1999). The petitioner is immune
from liability even if there is an improper purpose or motive. See E.R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (even if the petitioner's sole purpose was to destroy its competition
through passage of legislation, petitioner would be immune); Prof'l Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56
(1993). Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to actions, which might
otherwise violate the Sherman Act under the reasoning that "the federal
antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking
anticompetitive action from the government." Omni, 499 U.S. at 379-80.
Specifically, the antitrust laws are designed for the business world and "are
not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." Noerr, 365 U.S.
at 141.
In Walker Process, however, the Supreme Court held that the
enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the PTO may strip the patent
holder of its normal Noerr-Pennington defense to an antitrust counterclaim.
What impact do you think this decision had on business planning?
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Specifically, how would you advice clients seeking to petition the
government for redress after Walker Process was decided? Suppose A is
your client and B is A’s competitor. A holds a very valuable patent that
essentially is the reason his company is doing so well. However, B is
engaging highly anticompetitive conduct that is threatening the success of
your client’s company in addition to running him out of business. If A came
to you, asking whether or not to petition the government for redress, what
advice would you give him? Would your advice change if he discloses the
fact that he had sold his patented product prior to one year before his patent
was issued?
DIPPIN’ DOTS, INC. V. MOSEY
476 F.3d 1337 (C.A. Fed 2007)
GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.
This is a patent infringement and antitrust case dealing with a unique ice
cream product. Plaintiffs Dippin' Dots, Inc. and Curt D. Jones (collectively
“DDI”) appeal from the district court's claim construction and summary
judgment of noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,126,156 (“the ′156
patent”) and from the judgment following jury trial that all claims of that
patent are obvious, that the patent is unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct during prosecution, and that DDI violated the antitrust laws by
asserting a patent that had been procured through fraud on the Patent Office.
We affirm the judgments of noninfringement, obviousness, and
unenforceability, but reverse as to the antitrust counterclaim.
I. BACKGROUND
The ′156 patent, covering subject matter invented by plaintiff Jones and
exclusively licensed to plaintiff Dippin' Dots, is directed to a process for
making a form of cryogenically prepared novelty ice cream product. Claim
1, the only independent claim, reads:
A method of preparing and storing a free-flowing, frozen alimentary
dairy product, comprising the steps of:
[ (1) ] preparing an alimentary composition for freezing;
[ (2) ] dripping said alimentary composition into a
freezing chamber;
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[ (3) ] freezing said dripping alimentary composition into
beads;
[ (4) ] storing said beads at a temperature at least as low
as -20° F. so as to maintain said beads free-flowing for an
extended period of time;
[ (5) ] bringing said beads to a temperature between
substantially -10° F. and -20° F. prior to serving; and
[ (6) ] serving said beads for consumption at a
temperature between substantially -10° F. and -20° F. so that
said beads are free flowing when served.
′156 patent col.6 ll.41-57 (numbering added for reference). DDI has
commercialized this process. The ice cream it produces, sold under the
Dippin' Dots brand, is known to patrons of amusement parks, stadiums,
shopping malls, and the like….
Much of the debate in this case centers on the import of sales made at the
Festival Market mall in Lexington, Kentucky, more than a year before DDI
filed its patent application. Sales made more than one year before the
patent's priority date implicate the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). For the
′156 patent, this critical date is March 6, 1988. Starting on July 24, 1987,
Jones sold cryogenically-prepared, largely beaded ice cream at the Festival
Market. During Jones's time at Festival Market, which lasted at least until
July 29th, over 800 customers purchased his beaded ice cream and others
received free samples. The customers were permitted to leave with the
product and were not restricted by any kind of confidentiality agreement.
Jones later testified that his main goal at the Festival Market was to “get ...
test-marketing information” and not to further develop technical aspects of
his product such as particular temperature ranges for storage and service.
It is undisputed that the Festival Market sales were never disclosed to the
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) during prosecution of the ′156 patent.
The declaration of commercial success which ultimately persuaded the
examiner to grant the patent contained a sworn statement by Jones that
“[t]he initial sales were in March of 1988,” which was on or after the
critical date.
Jones testified that at Festival Market he only practiced the first three
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steps of the claimed method, not the storing, bringing, or serving steps. He
testified that he considered the evidence of what had happened at Festival
Market to be irrelevant to patentability. The attorney who prosecuted the ′
156 patent, Warren Schickli, testified that he considered the sales to have
been experimental since the process as practiced at Festival Market could
not be feasibly commercially exploited. He also testified that the Festival
Market ice cream was not sold for “direct consumption” under the meaning
of Claim 1, because the ice cream was too cold to eat comfortably when
initially given to the consumer.
The controversy in this case began when several of DDI's distributors
severed their relationship, found alternative manufacturing sources, and
entered into competition against DDI. DDI initiated a series of patent
infringement lawsuits against its new competitors in various judicial
districts. In this appeal, the defendants fall into two primary categories: the
“manufacturing parties” who make the competing ice cream product and the
“distributing parties” who sell it to consumers. The defendants
counterclaimed for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act due to DDI's
allegation of patent infringement based on a fraudulently acquired patent.
This type of antitrust claim has become known as a “ Walker Process ”
claim, named for the Supreme Court's decision in Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965). The various suits were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on MultiDistrict Litigation for pretrial proceedings before the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. That court adopted in large part
an earlier-recommended claim construction by a special master. In re
Dippin' Dots Patent Litig., 249 F.Supp.2d 1346 (N.D.Ga.2003). It issued
summary judgment of noninfringement both literally, id. at 1368, and via
the doctrine of equivalents, id. at 1370-71. It refused to grant summary
judgment to any party on invalidity, id. at 1362, 1364, or on inequitable
conduct, id. at 1365.
After the pretrial proceedings in the Northern District of Georgia were
completed, the case was remanded to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas…. That court conducted a jury trial on the
issues of invalidity, unenforceability, and antitrust violations by DDI. By
special verdict, the jury found that the sales by Jones prior to March 1988
could be asserted against the patent as prior art and that all claims of the
′156 patent were invalid as obvious. The jury also found that both Jones and
Schickli had, with intent to deceive, made material misrepresentations or
omissions in violation of the duty of candor to the PTO. It also determined
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that defendants Mini Melts, Inc. and Frosty Bites Distribution had proven
all required elements of their antitrust counterclaim, including the requisite
fraud on the PTO. However, it found no antitrust damages, granting the
counterclaim plaintiffs zero dollars in damages on their Sherman Act
counterclaim….. In its final judgment dated February 28, 2005, it awarded
attorney fees under the Clayton Act to defendant Frosty Bites Distribution
(“FBD”) in the amount of $676,675.46….
In its amended brief, DDI appeals the claim construction and summary
judgment of noninfringement, the refusal to overturn the jury verdict of
obviousness and liability under the antitrust laws, the finding of inequitable
conduct, and the award of attorneys' fees under the Clayton Act granted to
FBD. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
We have stated that “[a] patent may be rendered unenforceable for
inequitable conduct if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the
examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits materially false
information to the PTO during prosecution.” Digital Control Inc. v. The
Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2006). The party
urging unenforceability must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the applicant met “thresholds of both materiality and intent.” Molins PLC v.
Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed.Cir.1995). Where, as here, those factual
findings were made by the district court, we review them for clear error. Id.
The ultimate determination of inequitable conduct is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. We review for abuse of that discretion.
Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693-94
(Fed.Cir.2001).
The first prong of the inequitable conduct test, materiality, is clearly met
here. As discussed, the Festival Market sales render the ′ 156 patent invalid
for obviousness. Had those sales been disclosed to the PTO, the patent may
or may not have issued. At the very least, the existence of such sales prior to
the critical date is a matter that “a reasonable examiner would have
considered ... important in deciding whether to allow the ... application.”
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363
(Fed.Cir.2003); see also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (holding that
“reasonable examiner” standard remains sufficient ground for inequitable
conduct materiality even after 1992 amendment of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
The question of deceptive intent is a more difficult one, but we find no
clear error in the district court's determination on this point. “ ‘Smoking
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gun’ evidence is not required in order to establish an intent to deceive....
Rather, this element of inequitable conduct[ ] must generally be inferred
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant's overall
conduct.” Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,
1189 (Fed.Cir.1993). We have noted that omission of sales made before the
critical date is especially problematic:
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to
disclose sales that bear all the earmarks of commercialization
reasonably supports an inference that the inventor's attorney
intended to mislead the PTO. The concealment of sales information
can be particularly egregious because, unlike the applicant's failure
to disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the examiner
has no way of securing the information on his own.
Id. at 1193. While DDI wholly neglected to disclose the Festival Market
sales to the PTO, it enthusiastically touted sales made after the critical date
as evidence of the commercial appeal of its process. That combination of
action and omission permits an inference of the minimum, threshold level
of intent required for inequitable conduct. The evidence to support a finding
of intent may not be particularly strong here. However, the district court
was permitted to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent together
with the strong evidence that DDI's omission was highly material to the
issuance of the ′156 patent and to find that on balance, inequitable conduct
had occurred. Such a finding, as an exercise of the district court's equitable
powers, is within its discretion. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 (“Once
threshold findings of materiality and intent are established, the court must
weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that
inequitable conduct occurred.”). We perceive no abuse of discretion here.
The district court's inequitable conduct finding is correct.
The defendants in this case counterclaimed against DDI for violation of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, and the same jury that found the patent obvious
found DDI liable on that counterclaim. Proof that a patentee has “obtained
the patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent
Office ... [is] sufficient to strip [the patentee] of its exemption from the
antitrust laws.” Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). A party who asserts such a fraudulently obtained
patent may be subject to an antitrust claim. If a patentee asserts a patent
claim and the defendant can demonstrate the required fraud on the PTO, as
well as show that “the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present,”
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the defendant-counterclaimant is entitled to treble damages under the
antitrust laws. Id. at 175.
The first barrier for a Walker Process claimant to clear is the
requirement that the patent be obtained through actual fraud upon the PTO.
This question is governed by Federal Circuit law. Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.Cir.1998) ( en banc in
relevant part). A finding of inequitable conduct does not by itself suffice to
support a finding of Walker Process fraud, because “inequitable conduct is
a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to
support a Walker Process counterclaim.” Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069.
To demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher
threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are required to show
inequitable conduct. Id. at 1070-71; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157
F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1998) ( Walker Process claimant “must make a
greater showing of scienter and materiality than when seeking
unenforceability based on conduct before the Patent Office”). Furthermore,
a finding of Walker Process fraud cannot result from an equitable balancing
between the two factors; a strong showing of one cannot make up for a
deficiency in the other. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. The difference in
breadth between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud admits the
possibility of a close case whose facts reach the level of inequitable
conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a case.
The heightened standard of materiality in a Walker Process case requires
that the patent would not have issued but for the patent examiner's
justifiable reliance on the patentee's misrepresentation or omission. C.R.
Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364. The defendants have established materiality even
under this strict threshold, since the evidence supports a finding that the
patent would not have issued if DDI had disclosed the Festival Market sales
to the PTO. The difficulty comes in establishing that the omission of those
sales was done with fraudulent intent. DDI did make certain statements to
the PTO that would have been more completely accurate had it included
information about the Festival Market sales. For instance, it suggested that
its method was “the first method to allow serving of a completely free
flowing frozen alimentary dairy product for direct consumption by
consumers.” That statement would have been more helpful to the PTO if it
had also disclosed that the first free-flowing sales had arguably happened at
Festival Market, but the statement was not actually false. Likewise, DDI
argued against obviousness by pointing out that none of the cited references
taught free-flowing service. Again, this statement would have better
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informed the PTO if it had clarified that elsewhere in the prior art, such
service arguably existed, but again, the statement was true. The problem
was not with its falsity but with its incompleteness.
Ultimately, the defendants' fraud case here is built only upon DDI's
omission of the Festival Market sales from the prosecution record. While
Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a
case, “[a] mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not suffice.”
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. This is not to say that an omission always
reduces to “mere failure to cite.” We acknowledged in Nobelpharma “that
omissions, as well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances
support a finding of Walker Process fraud ... because a fraudulent omission
can be just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation.” 141 F.3d at
1070. We believe, though, that to find a prosecution omission fraudulent
there must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the
omission. A false or clearly misleading prosecution statement may permit
an inference that the statement was made with deceptive intent. For
instance, evidence may establish that a patent applicant knew one fact and
presented another, thus allowing the fact finder to conclude that the
applicant intended by the misrepresentation to deceive the examiner. That is
not the case with an omission, which could happen for any number of
nonfraudulent reasons-the applicant could have had a good-faith belief that
disclosure was not necessary, or simply have forgotten to make the required
disclosure. In this case, DDI argues that it did not disclose the Festival
Market sales to the PTO because it believed that the product there was made
without practicing the “storing,” “bringing,” or “serving” steps of the claim
within the specified temperature ranges, and that therefore the Festival
Market sales were merely cumulative to other prior art references which
also lacked those three steps. The jury was of course allowed to disbelieve
or discount evidence tending to support this claim. However, the defendants
submitted no evidence of their own-aside from the absence of the Festival
Market sales from the prosecution record-which affirmatively shows DDI's
fraudulent intent. That intent cannot be shown merely from the absence of
evidence, which would come about from the jury's discounting DDI's
explanation.
Nobelpharma serves as a good example of the sort of facts that do prove
Walker Process fraud by omission. In that case, the inventors had
transmitted to their Swedish patent agent a draft patent application which
included a citation to a book written by the patentee in 1977. Nobelpharma,
141 F.3d at 1062. That book was eventually held to anticipate the patent. Id.
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at 1072. The agent “deleted all reference to the 1977 Book from the patent
application that was ultimately filed in Sweden” and then also failed to
mention the book in the U.S. application that led to the patent at issue. Id. at
1062. When pressed on the issue at trial, the agent “could not explain, even
in retrospect, why he deleted all reference to the 1977 Book.” Id. at 1072.
We found that the evidence of actual deletion by the patent agent gave the
jury reasonable ground to find intent to defraud by the patentees.
There is no similarly strong evidence that the omission in this case was
fraudulent. It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so
important to patentability, DDI must have known of its importance and
must have made a conscious decision not to disclose it. That argument has
some force, but to take it too far would be to allow the high materiality of
the omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of deceptive intent by
the patentee. Weighing intent and materiality together is appropriate when
assessing whether the patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable.
Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178. However, when Walker Process claimants wield
that conduct as a “sword” to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a mere
“shield” against enforcement of the patent, Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070,
they must prove deceptive intent independently. The defendants have not
done so here to the extent necessary for a reasonable jury to find Walker
Process fraud. The finding of fraud on the PTO is therefore reversed.
DDI also argues that the antitrust judgment must be reversed because the
jury was not presented with sufficient evidence of the definition of the
relevant market. Fraudulent acquisition of the asserted patent strips the
Walker Process defendant of its antitrust immunity, but that is the
beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. The counterclaimant must also show
the basic elements of an antitrust violation defined by the regional circuit's
law, including that the patentee's behavior was directed to a relevant
product market. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d
1341, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2004), rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). In
this case, DDI's antitrust immunity remains intact due to insufficient
evidence of fraud. We therefore reach neither DDI's argument on this point
nor the defendants' argument that DDI waived the market definition issue
by failing to raise it below.
With the judgment of antitrust liability reversed, the grant of attorney's
fees under § 4 of the Clayton Act must be vacated.
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The Federal Circuit insisted on something more than simply lying about
barring prior sales in order to ratchet the defendant’s misrepresentation
from inequitable conduct to an antitrust violation. But what about the fact
that years later – after the evidence of the barring sales had grown stale and
could be found only by luck – the patentee filed an infringement suit?
Shouldn’t the antitrust issue be evaluated as of the time the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct took place rather than during the patent application
process?
2. Bifurcation. Walker Process suits are typically raised as counterclaims to
patent infringement litigation.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)
provides that courts may bifurcate a trial even where related patent and
antitrust claims are consolidated for purposes of discovery and pretrial
under Rule 42(a). In this instance, the bifurcated claims are tried separately
but are not considered severed. Dante Disparte v. Corp. Exec. Bd., 223
F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 2004).
When deciding whether or not to bifurcate claims, courts are
given discretion and generally focus on whether “both parties, using
different triers of fact, could prevail on their respective claims
without prejudicing the other party or arriving at inconsistent
results.” Dante Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 12. Today, bifurcation is
common in patent cases that involve antitrust counterclaims and the
Federal Circuit has referred to the process as “standard” in cases
involving the two claims. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. GenRAd, Inc.,
882 F.Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“courts often separate
patent issues from antitrust counterclaim suits”); Alarm Device Mfg.
Co. v. Alarm Prods. Int’l., 60 F.D.R. 199, 202 (E.D.N.Y 1973)
(“[m]ore often than not, separate trials of patent validityinfringement claims and misuse-antitrust claims have been found to
be salutary”).

IGT V. ALLIANCE GAMING CORP.
2012 WL 6554712 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2012)
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
IGT owns several patents related to “wheel games,” a type of casino
gaming machine containing a secondary bonus game incorporating a
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spinning wheel. IGT sued Alliance Gaming Corp., Bally Gaming
International, Inc., and Bally Gaming, Inc. (collectively, “Bally”) for
infringement of these patents, and Bally counterclaimed under state and
federal antitrust laws. The district court denied the motions for summary
judgment on the antitrust issues, granted the motions that the patents were
invalid and not infringed, and certified the patent issues for interlocutory
appeal. This court affirmed. On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment against Bally on its antitrust counterclaims. Because the
undisputed facts are insufficient to establish the existence of a relevant
antitrust market in wheel games, we affirm….
As a threshold issue in any monopolization claim, the court must
identify the relevant market.
M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d
1303, 1306 (9th Cir.1982). “The relevant market is the field in which
meaningful competition is said to exist.” Image Technical Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1997). “Market
definition can be broadly characterized in terms of the ‘cross-elasticity of
demand’ for or ‘reasonable interchangeability’ of a given set of products or
services.” M.A.P. Oil, 691 F.2d at 1306 (quoting United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)). Definition of the relevant
market is a question of fact. Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg.
FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir.2008).
Both Bally and IGT provided extensive evidence that wheel games
compete in the broader gaming machine market. Mr. Isaacs, Bally's
corporate designee on the wheel game market, stated that he thought “just
about anything may have potentially displaced the Bally wheel game.”
Bally's former Vice President of Business Development explained that
Bally's wheel game “compete[d] with everything that's on the floor. The
way it works is that you sell a machine and it competes against everything
there.”
Bally did not rebut this evidence. As Bally has failed to produce
evidence to show there is a genuine issue of material fact that wheel games
compete with all gaming machines, the district court did not resolve a
disputed factual issue. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421,
1435 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986)).
The district court rejected wheel games as a relevant market because
a market limited to wheel games would not encompass all economic
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substitutes. Focusing on the same undisputed evidence that supported its
conclusion that wheel games compete with all gaming machines—
specifically, that “casinos mix and match products to maximize floor-space
revenue generation”—the court reasoned that “the relevant market is
significantly broader than ‘wheel games' because there is ample evidence
that non-wheel games compete with wheel games.” The court rejected
Bally's argument that this competition does not prevent wheel games from
being a relevant market, concluding that “[b] ecause all gaming machines
compete, wheel games are not an economically distinct submarket.” Bally
argues this was error because (1) the existence of some substitution does not
preclude wheel games from being a submarket, and (2) the analysis focused
on functional, rather than economic, substitution. We address each point in
turn.
As discussed above, Bally does not dispute that wheel games
compete with all gaming machines. Bally does argue, however, that it was
error for the district court to conclude that this competition prevented wheel
games from being a relevant market. As authority for this argument, Bally
points to Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., in which this
court, applying Tenth Circuit law, said: “For every product, substitutes
exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite
range.” 375 F.3d 1341, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Times–Picayune
Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 n. 31 (1953)), rev'd on other
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). The truth of this proposition is evident, as is
the question it suggests: where should the courts draw the line? The
remainder of the quotation from Times–Picayune suggests an answer: “The
circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which,
within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will
turn; in technical terms, products whose cross-elasticities of demand are
small.” Times–Picayune, 345 U.S. at 613, n. 31. This simply refers to the
well-settled relevant market inquiry focusing on economic substitution.
Bally argues that it has shown a lack of economic substitution by
satisfying what is known as the small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price test (“SSNIP”). Under this test, Bally argues that the
relevant question is “whether the degree of substitutability between the two
products is sufficiently great that it would restrain a hypothetical
monopolist from profitably imposing a substantial price increase.” Even
assuming that SSNIP by itself is the proper test,1 Bally has not alleged facts
1

As support for its assertion that SSNIP is the controlling test, Bally cites Theme
Promotions, which did allow that “[d] etermining the relevant market can involve” an
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that would satisfy it. Bally contends that introduction of wheel games
forced IGT to lower its prices. From this assertion, Bally argues that IGT's
prior prices were supracompetitive. We accept both of these assertions as
true. But Bally next asserts that these supracompetitive prices represented a
SSNIP. With this we cannot agree. Bally has not explained what the
baseline price for wheel games was from which IGT imposed a SSNIP.
Although Bally implies that the baseline price should be similar to nonwheel games, no evidence supports this. Indeed, in a differentiated market,
one would expect the prices for two differentiated products to be different.
Having failed to establish such a baseline, Bally cannot successfully argue
that IGT imposed a SSNIP. Furthermore, if we regard the supracompetitive
prices as a baseline, Bally has shown that the prices decreased, not that they
increased. Thus, even if the Guidelines test governs here, Bally has failed to
put forth evidence that would satisfy it.
We also reject Bally's argument that the district court improperly
focused on technological substitutions. The basis for this argument is the
district court's statement that “it is undisputed that the relevant functionality
of gaming machines is revenue generation.” The court made this statement
in the context of its description of the differentiated market of gaming
machines in which wheel games compete. We hold that the court based its
ultimate conclusion on competition, not on functionality, and that its
recognition of meaningful competition was not error.
In addition to its argument that wheel games is a relevant market,
Bally also contends that the Brown Shoe factors establish wheel games as a
submarket.2 “[A] lthough the general market must include all economic
substitutes, it is legally permissible to premise antitrust allegations on a
submarket.” Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038,
1045 (9th Cir.2008); Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875
F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.1989) (“In limited settings ... the relevant product
market may be narrowed beyond the boundaries of physical
interchangeability and cross-price elasticity to account for identifiable
submarkets....”). To the extent that the standard for defining a submarket
SSNIP analysis, among other things. 546 F.3d at 1002. But the discussion of SSNIP in
Theme Promotions was premised on United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098
(N.D.Cal.2004), which in turn was elaborating on the Department of Justice's Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Guidelines are
not binding on the courts. See Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.1993).
2

We assume, although Bally does not explicitly say so, that Bally's argument is that
wheel games are a submarket of all gaming machines.
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differs from the standard for defining a market, it is embodied in the Brown
Shoe factors.3 In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court listed several “practical
indicia” of an economically distinct submarket: “industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors.” 370 U.S. at 325. “[T]he Brown Shoe indicia are practical aids for
identifying the areas of actual or potential competition and ... their presence
or absence does not decide automatically the submarket issue.” Thurman,
875 F.2d at 1375. “Whether isolating a submarket is justified turns
ultimately upon whether the factors used to define the submarket are
‘economically significant.’” Id. (quoting Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 932 (9th Cir.1975)).
The undisputed facts, however, are insufficient to establish the
existence of a submarket under the Brown Shoe factors. By definition, the
“peculiar characteristic” distinguishing wheel games from other games is
the wheel-shaped secondary bonus. It is undisputed that there are no unique
production facilities or specialized vendors for wheel games versus ordinary
gaming machines; one can just as easily produce a gaming machine with a
square bonus as one with a circular bonus. This factor is particularly
important in this case. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 n. 42 (“The crosselasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in defining
a product market.”); Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436 (“[D]efining a market on
the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous.”); Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.1976) (“[F]ailure to
consider production cross-elasticity [i]s inconsistent with the views of the
Supreme Court and of this circuit.”); see generally Areeda ¶ 561, at 360–64.
It is also undisputed that there are no distinct customers: wheel games, like
all gaming machines, are purchased by casinos.
Bally's argument rests entirely on a single Brown Shoe factor: that
“there is substantial evidence that game players, casinos, and IGT all view
wheel games as a separate economic activity from non-wheel games.” Bally
3

A leading antitrust treatise suggests that the two inquiries are the same. See IIB
Phillip E. Areeda, John L. Solow & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 533c (3d
ed.2007) [hereinafter Areeda]. Although at least one district court in the Ninth Circuit has
adopted this position, see United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1118–19
(N.D.Cal.2009), we are aware of no Ninth Circuit case that has done so. See Newcal, 513
F.3d at 1045 (identifying the Brown Shoe factors as one way of showing that a submarket
is economically distinct). In any event, we have already determined that Bally did not meet
its burden to show that there was a relevant market in wheel games.

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 22
August 2013

bases this argument primarily on evidence that some players prefer wheel
games and that, accordingly, casinos allocate a specific percentages of their
floor space to different types of games, including to wheel games. But
evidence of player preference for wheel games says nothing about whether
there is a public or industry perception that wheel games constitute a
separate market; to the contrary, it is in harmony with the rest of the
evidence that gaming machines are a differentiated market and that wheel
games compete with all gaming machines to accommodate the spectrum of
player preferences.
In addition to its market definition arguments, Bally contends that
the district court erred by resolving factual disputes on summary judgment.
In particular, Bally contends that IGT and its experts “have repeatedly and
consistently testified that non-wheel games are not substitutes for wheel
games.” Although Bally provides no further explanation, we understand this
argument to refer to statements IGT and its experts made in support of its
patent damages theory.
To prove its patent damages, IGT chose to seek lost profits under the
Panduit test. Under the Panduit factors, IGT was required to prove the
absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes. See Rite–Hite Corp. v.
Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (citing Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir.1978)). By
claiming that the wheel feature was critical, IGT was able to argue that there
were no non-infringing substitutes for its wheel game, and that every
infringing game sold represented a loss of profits to IGT. According to
Bally, by making this argument, “IGT has admitted that there are no
substitutes for wheel games and that non-wheel games are not in the same
market as wheel games.” We disagree.
Even under the summary judgment standard, Troxel's (IGT’s patent
damages expert) opinion that there were no non-infringing technological
substitutes cannot be read to mean that there were no economic substitutes.
To do so, Troxel's opinion would need to be able to support a reasonable
inference that no economic substitution existed. But, as Bally
acknowledges, Troxel simply “relied on Bally's assertion that wheel games
are an antitrust market.” Because Troxel simply assumed that the market
was co-extensive with the patent, however, such an inference would be
unreasonable. See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435 (“In the context of antitrust
law, if there are undisputed facts about the structure of the market that
render the inference economically unreasonable, the expert opinion is
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insufficient to support a jury verdict.”). And, as discussed above, even if
wheel games are a relevant market, the high supply elasticity rendered
demand elasticity immaterial. Id. at 1436 (holding that excessive supply
elasticity rendered it “immaterial that consumers do not regard the products
as substitutes, that a price differential exists, or that the prices are not
closely correlated.”). We therefore conclude that the district court's order
did not resolve disputed issues of material fact.
The undisputed facts in this case show that meaningful competition
exists between wheel games and all gaming machines. Furthermore, even
viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Bally, the Brown Shoe
factors do not support a conclusion that wheel games should be considered
a separate submarket. The district court correctly granted summary
judgment that a wheel game market did not exist, and the decision is hereby
AFFIRMED
BRYSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
… Bally has shown that IGT was charging supracompetitive prices
before Bally entered the wheel game market and that Bally's entrance into
the market pressured IGT to lower its prices to a competitive level. Ron
Rivera, IGT's Senior Vice President of Sales, testified that IGT successfully
rebuffed calls for discounts on its wheel games before Bally began
manufacturing wheel games, but that it was forced to acquiesce in those
demands when customers were able to buy Bally's wheel games. IGT
admits that the discounts were the direct and sole result of Bally introducing
its wheel games into the market. The fact that IGT's wheel games were
subject to price pressure only when other wheel games entered the market
indicates that consumers were willing to incur monopolistic pricing without
shifting demand to non-wheel games, i.e., that there was very little, if any,
cross-elasticity of demand between wheel games and non-wheel games.
IGT's own expert, Richard Troxel, admitted that he saw no need to
calculate cross-elasticity of demand because there was such strong demand
for wheel games independent of demand for non-wheel games: “[T]he
wheel has such a demand and drawing power for consumers that ... it
seemed to me that the price elasticity was not the issue. Price elasticity
occurs when you have products that are of a nature that price is going to
make a difference to the consumer, and whether or not they would move to
a different type of product or not. In this case the wheel was what they

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 24
August 2013

wanted.” That evidence indicates that there was demand for wheel games
separate from casino gaming machines generally and that consumers would
rather bear a small but significant non-transitory increase in price than
switch to non-wheel games.
That analysis is consistent with the evidence from Bally's expert,
Gregory Adams. While referring to IGT's economic data, he stated that the
margin and profit per unit for wheel games is higher than for non-wheel
games and that “the demand for wheel games appears to differ from the
demand for non-wheel games, even when controlling for [all other
variables].” Those statements and the economic data underlying them
provide further support for Bally's contention that wheel games form a
separate product market.
IGT asserts that Bally was required to calculate cross elasticity of
demand and that Bally's failure to do so is fatal to its claim. The case law,
however, does not mandate such a showing by an antitrust plaintiff. See,
e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 804 (9th Cir.1976)
(plaintiffs did not have to “produce a numerical value of the cross-elasticity
of demand” to prove a relevant market; “[p]roofs of the [ Brown Shoe ]
factors ... would have sufficed”)…. [S]ee also Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1376–78 (Fed.Cir.2003) (crediting expert who
purportedly “failed to calculate the cross-elasticities of demand” and finding
that the “failure to present all of the economic evidence that Harris now
identifies does not mean that Ericsson failed to present sound economic
evidence”). Bally's evidence indicates a clear absence of cross-elasticity of
demand between wheel and non-wheel games that obviates the need to
quantify the degree of the elasticity.
The majority contends that Bally's relevant market argument fails
because it has not offered evidence as to the baseline prices for wheel
games from which IGT obtained a premium based on its allegedly
monopolistic practices. But Bally offered evidence that, when it introduced
wheel games into the market, IGT was required to reduce its prices, and that
evidence included the amount by which those prices were reduced when
competitive wheel games became available. That is precisely the kind of
evidence that shows the effect of the allegedly monopolistic conduct on the
market. See 2B Philip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶¶ 533b, 563a (3d ed. 2007) (“
Areeda ”).

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 25
August 2013

IGT's evidence of lost profits due to patent infringement provides a
further indication that the relevant market is limited to wheel games. See
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th
Cir.1978). In making its case for damages in the form of lost profits, IGT
asserted that there were no acceptable noninfringing substitutes for its
wheel games. Mr. Troxel testified that there were no non-wheel game
substitutes and that Bally's wheel games replaced IGT's wheel games on a
one-for-one basis. Because “ Panduit's second factor, properly applied,
ensures that any proffered alternative competes in the same market for the
same customers as the infringer's product[,]” BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v.
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed.Cir.1993), the lack of any
acceptable non-infringing alternatives strongly suggests that the market
consisted of only IGT's and Bally's wheel games. In other words, IGT's
evidence that there were no alternatives to which consumers could shift
their demand other than Bally's products is evidence that the relevant
market was limited to wheel games.
IGT's higher prices and profit margins on wheel games cannot be
attributed simply to normal economic performance in a differentiated
product market that includes wheel and non-wheel games. The court in
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1116 (N.D.Cal.2004),
addressed that issue persuasively, explaining why monopolistic rents do not
survive in a differentiated market lacking barriers to entry:
Like a seller in a perfect competitive market, however, sellers in
a “competitive” differentiated products market do not obtain
monopoly rents. In differentiated product markets with few barriers
to entry, firms will introduce products that are increasingly close,
although not perfect substitutes, for the other products in the market.
The introduction of additional products causes the demand curve
faced by each seller to shift downward and leftward until, at long
run equilibrium, the demand curve intersects the average cost curve
of the seller (defined as economists define costs to include a
reasonable profit) eliminating the monopolistic rent....
Although close substitutes, such as reel bonus games and tower
bonus games, had been introduced, casinos still sought out wheel games
despite the higher prices for those products, indicating the existence of a
separate market for wheel games. If a product is priced higher than similar
competing products, rational costminimizing consumers will shift to the
lower-priced similar products, even if the lower-priced products differ
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somewhat from the preferred product. If, instead, there are no similar or
acceptable alternatives (as occurs in a monopolized market or where patent
protection bars the introduction of competitive alternatives), consumers will
bear the increased price for the preferred product because there are no
satisfactory alternatives to which demand can be shifted.
Because IGT's patents barred potential competitors from marketing
wheel games, the majority's reference to supply elasticity is beside the
point.4 The majority argues that the fact that there are no unique production
facilities or specialized vendors for wheel games indicates that there is
production cross-elasticity and thus elasticity of supply. But the existence of
IGT's patents barred competitors from producing wheel games regardless of
how easy it would have been to do so. The whole point of IGT's obtaining
patent protection for wheel games was to limit the economic effects of
supply elasticity.
Bally's evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether IGT used its patents to maintain a monopoly in a market
that was sufficiently separate from the market for other slot machines that
IGT was able to demand monopolistic prices over an extended period of
time. It is not enough to say that IGT's wheel games competed with other
bonus games or other slot machines in general. It could equally be said that
IGT's machines competed with other casino games or even with
entertainment activities generally. But that does not overcome Bally's
showing that there was a discrete market for wheel games within the overall
slot machine, gaming, and entertainment markets, as demonstrated by the
persistent monopolistic prices that resulted from the patent-based
curtailment of supply and the customer-preference driven specificity of
demand. See Areeda § 533c, at 255.5
4

Supply elasticity is a theory that neither party advanced. In fact, IGT argued that “the
critical question in determining an antitrust product market is the “ ‘cross elasticity” of
demand’ between products.... Stated differently, the relevant antitrust market is the smallest
group of products for which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a ‘small but
significant and nontransitory increase in price’ (SSNIP).” The majority not only assigns
weight to the allegedly high supply elasticity for wheel games but, in discussing demand
elasticity, disparages the same test that IGT believed to be “the critical question” in
resolving this issue.
5
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995), on which the
majority relies, stands for the unremarkable proposition that a high degree of supply
elasticity can bear on the relevant market inquiry and may even be determinative in some
cases. In that case the court found that full-serve gas stations were potential competitors of
self-serve stations—and thus belonged in the relevant market—because full-serve stations
could “easily convert their full-serve pumps, at virtually no cost, into self-serve, cash-only
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In light of the record evidence summarized above, I conclude that
Bally has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to
find that the relevant product market is limited to wheel games. The
relevant market inquiry seeks to determine the scope of the market in which
a monopolist can exert market power over buyers. Bally alleges, and has
introduced evidence to prove, that IGT had market power over buyers in
supplying wheel games. I therefore respectfully dissent.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. What of the fact that when the infringement defendant entered the
market the infringement plaintiff was forced to cut its prices? That
indicates that the competition between the two was much closer than the
competition with other (i.e., non-wheel) games, does it not? Should that be
enough to support a conclusion of market power?
2. The SSNIP test (“small but significant and non-transitory increase in
price”) comes from the government Merger Guidelines, which query
whether a merger might injure competition by imposing such a price
increase. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1 (4th ed. 2011). If the
grouping of sales in which the merger occurs could experience such a price
increase profitably, then that grouping is a relevant market. The test does
not work very well for monopolist’s however, because it is often the case
that the monopolist is already charging a monopoly price to begin with.
What about margins. The dissent noted that the margins on wheel games
were higher than on non-wheel games. A “margin” is the difference
between a cost measure, typically marginal cost or variable cost, and the
amount of revenue that the seller obtains from the sale.
The use of margins is particularly problematic when a large
component in a product consists of intellectual property rights, where the
costs of making an additional unit are very small. For example, in the case
of a pure software product, such as Microsoft Office, the costs of making
pumps, expanding output and thus constraining any attempt by [the alleged monopolist] to
charge supracompetitive prices for self-serve gasoline.” Id. at 1436. Critically, however,
nothing prevented the full-serve stations from making that change to their business in order
to deter or rein in potentially monopolistic pricing by self-serve stations. Here, by contrast,
potential suppliers were discouraged from entering the wheel game market by vigorous
enforcement of the very patents that are being attacked as unlawful.
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one additional unit are very close to zero when the copy is being
downloaded, or the costs of a DVD plus packaging when it is being sold in
a physical package. Nevertheless, the product might claim a price of, say,
$200. The games in this case were a combination of physical product, some
elements of which were patented, and also software.
3. Supply elasticity, or cross-elasticity of supply, refers to whether rivals
can develop the alleged dominant firm’s product in response to its higher
(monopoly) profits. As the dissent points out, patents can reduce elasticity
of supply by making it more difficult to copy a firm’s products. The
question is complicated, however. Sometimes a firm can easily invent
around a patent, and then the patent offers little protection from market
entry. Sometimes the patent adds so little value to a product that others can
compete without employing the device or technology that the patent
protects.
IN RE DDAVP DIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
585 F.3d 677 (2nd Cir. 2009)
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
This case presents a novel question of standing that lies at the junction
of antitrust and patent law. The plaintiffs, direct purchasers of desmopressin
acetate tablets (sold under the name DDAVP), filed this class action in the
Southern District of New York against the defendants Ferring B.V., Ferring
Pharmaceuticals (collectively, “Ferring”), and Aventis Pharmaceuticals
(“Aventis”),alleging that Ferring and Aventis abused the patent system to
unlawfully maintain a monopoly over DDAVP. Ferring developed,
patented, and manufactures DDAVP, and Aventis holds FDA approval for
DDAVP tablets as well as a license from Ferring to market and sell the
drug. The plaintiffs alleged that Ferring and Aventis inflated the price of
DDAVP by suppressing generic competition for the tablets in violation of
the antitrust laws. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the
plaintiffs both lacked antitrust standing and had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. This appeal followed…..
In 2002, Ferring filed a patent infringement suit against Barr
Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”), which came before the same district judge who
later presided over this action…. Ferring's suit failed. On summary
judgment, the district court found that the ′398 patent, rather than having
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been infringed by Barr, was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
before the PTO by Ferring and its agents…. The Federal Circuit affirmed.
See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc. (“ Ferring I”), 437 F.3d 1181
(Fed.Cir.2006)….
Less than two months after the Federal Circuit's February 2006 ruling,
the direct purchaser plaintiffs filed the instant suit. … The plaintiffs claim
that the lack of competing, generic versions of DDAVP injured them by
forcing them to pay monopolistic prices for the drug.
Ferring and Aventis jointly moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that, inter alia, the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claimed antitrust
violations. …
… As an initial matter, the district court noted the lack of binding
precedent “with regard to the specific issue of whether purchaser plaintiffs
like those in this case have standing to assert a Walker Process claim.” Id.
at 10-11. The district court then held that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust
standing for their Walker Process claim because the ′398 patent had not
been enforced against them, and they were not competitors of Ferring or
Aventis.
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this
action. We review questions of standing de novo. Comer v. Cisneros, 37
F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir.1994). In addition to demonstrating Article III
standing, an antitrust plaintiff must also establish antitrust standing. See
Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290 (2d
Cir.2006). We analyze antitrust standing under a two-part test: a plaintiff
must show (1) antitrust injury, which is “injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful,” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977), and (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four “efficient
enforcer” factors:
(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence
of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would
normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the alleged injury; and (4)
the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among
direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries.
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In his case, the plaintiffs are purchasers of the defendants' product who
allege being forced to pay supra-competitive prices as a result of the
defendants' anticompetitive conduct. Such an injury plainly is “of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489;
see also AGC, 459 U.S. at 530 (“Congress was primarily interested in
creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay
excessive prices by the giant trusts and combinations that dominated certain
interstate markets.”). Although the defendants' conduct at issue targeted
their competitors, such as Barr, the plaintiffs' claimed injury of higher prices
was “inextricably intertwined” with the conduct's anti-competitive effects
and thus “flow[ed] from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.” Blue
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Antitrust injury is therefore present.
As for the “efficient enforcer” factors that bear on whether the plaintiffs
are “proper” antitrust plaintiffs, spelled out in Volvo, each favors granting
antitrust standing. With respect to the first factor, directness of injury, even
though the plaintiffs' injuries were derivative of the direct harm experienced
by the defendants' competitors, harming competitors was simply a means
for the defendants to charge the plaintiffs higher prices. See Id. at 478-79,;
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400-01 (3d Cir.2000).
This factor supports the plaintiffs' standing.
As for the second factor, motivation, the defendants argue that their
competitors are the parties most motivated to enforce the antitrust laws,
because the competitors were most directly impacted by the alleged
anticompetitive behavior. They note that we declined to find antitrust
standing in Paycom in part because the plaintiff there was “not an entity
whose self-interest would most ‘motivate [it] to vindicate the public interest
in antitrust enforcement.’ ” 467 F.3d at 294 (quoting AGC, 459 U.S. at 542)
(alteration in original). But this argument overlooks the fact that the
Paycom court asked if the plaintiff was an entity most motivated by selfinterest, not the entity most motivated by self-interest. See Id. The second
factor simply looks for a class of persons naturally motivated to enforce the
antitrust laws. “Inferiority” to other potential plaintiffs can be relevant, but
it is not dispositive. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Int'l, 256
F.3d 799, 816 (D.C.Cir.2001). Even if the competitors might be the most
motivated, the plaintiffs are also significantly motivated due to their
“natural economic self-interest” in paying the lowest price possible. See
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 444 (2d Cir.2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Moreover, the defendants' competitors, unlike the plaintiffs, would be
seeking lost profits, not overcharges. Lost profits are the difference between
the competitive price and what the competitors' costs would have been,
while overcharges are the difference between the defendants' supracompetitive price and the competitive price. Denying the plaintiffs a remedy
in favor of a suit by competitors would thus be “likely to leave a significant
antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542; see
also Andrx Pharms., 256 F.3d at 817 (noting that lost profits and
overcharges are distinct injuries). The second factor supports standing.
Tuning to speculativeness, the third factor, the defendants argue that the
plaintiffs' allegations rest upon tenuous assumptions about the beneficial
effects of generic competition. The assumptions are not as speculative as
the defendants suggest. That no other manufacturer would have obtained a
patent on the drug is a fair assumption, we think, given that “[t]he
reluctance of the PTO to issue the ′398 patent was evident” in advance of
the defendants' inequitable conduct. Ferring I, 437 F.3d at 1186. And that
generic manufacturers would have decided to compete for DDAVP sales is
self-evident: manufacturers sought approval for generic DDAVP when the
′398 patent was still enforceable. It may be difficult to account precisely for
the likely effects of generic competition, but we have little doubt that those
effects can be sufficiently estimated and measured here. See Geneva
Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 499 (2d Cir.2004)
(listing literature analyzing generic drug competition). This is especially so
when “[t]he most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his
own wrong has created.” Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,
265 (1946). Like the first two factors, the third factor supports the plaintiffs'
antitrust standing.
As for the fourth factor, the potential for duplicative recovery, the
difference between lost profits and overcharges is again relevant. Even
assuming some overlap between lost profits and overcharges (as could
occur if generic manufacturers charged more than the competitive price),
the two are conceptually different measures that we think can be fairly
apportioned in order to avoid duplicative recoveries. See Andrx Pharms.,
256 F.3d at 817. This factor also supports the plaintiffs' antitrust standing.
In sum, then, although the relative weight given to each factor is
imprecise, see, e.g., Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443, the plaintiffs would be
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efficient enforcers under any formulation. What complicates the standing
question, however, is the centrality of the alleged Walker Process fraud to
the plaintiffs' case. Walker Process claims are based on a fraudulently
obtained patent, and are typically brought as counterclaims in patent
infringement suits: the plaintiff claims the defendant infringed his patent,
and the defendant responds that the patent was invalid as fraudulently
obtained, and that the plaintiff's enforcement efforts violate Walker Process.
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067
(Fed.Cir.1998). If a patent is valid, a Walker Process claim cannot stand.
Outside of an infringement suit counterclaim, a patent's validity can be
challenged only by a party (1) producing or preparing to produce the
patented product, and (2) being threatened or reasonably likely to be
threatened with an infringement suit. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 862 (Fed.Cir.1987). As purchasers of DDAVP, the
plaintiffs do not satisfy these requirements and cannot directly challenge the
′398 patent's validity. As the district court noted, whether the plaintiffs have
standing to bring their Walker Process claim, when a court has yet to find
the ′398 patent fraudulently obtained, is a question of first impression.
The defendants acknowledge that Walker Process standing might be
warranted for a purchaser when a patent has already been held to have been
fraudulently procured. But the defendants urge us to hold that, when dealing
with a patent not yet found to be fraudulently obtained, a party has Walker
Process standing only if that party also has standing to challenge the
patent's validity. They argue that giving Walker Process standing to the
plaintiffs, who cannot directly challenge the ′398 patent's validity, could
result in an avalanche of patent challenges, because direct purchasers
otherwise unable to challenge a patent's validity could do so simply by
dressing their patent challenge with a Walker Process claim….
Walker Process itself, of course, reflects a willingness to let antitrust
liability impact the patent system. However, the defendants argue that
Walker Process is the product of the Supreme Court's careful balancing of
antitrust and patent policies, a balance which should not be upset and under
which Walker Process plaintiffs must be independently able to first prove
the patent's fraudulent procurement. Yet the language of Walker Process
does not necessarily suggest such a limit:
While one of [the claim's] elements is the fraudulent
procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the
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patent's annulment. The gist of Walker's claim is that since Food
Machinery obtained its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited
exception to the prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, but must
answer under that section ... to those injured by any monopolistic
action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Nor can the interest
in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable vexatious suits' be used to
frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws.
To be sure, the Walker Process Court also noted that allowing antitrust
recovery “accord[ed]” with the “long-recognized procedures” that
controlled how parties could challenge a patent's validity, thereby
suggesting that the Court may not have envisioned expanding the universe
of potential patent challengers.
Nonetheless, we are reluctant to embrace the defendants' position
because we are wary of creating the potential “to leave a significant antitrust
violation undetected or unremedied.” As the defendants would have it,
direct purchasers would be able to recover antitrust damages from a
fraudulent patentee only after that patentee first loses on a fraudulent
procurement claim. This asks too much of the generic competitors and other
potential patent challengers, who may not have the strategic interest or the
resources to start or win such a battle, or who may be presented with strong
incentives to settle their challenge by patent holders seeking not only to
preserve their patent's enforceability, but also to avoid potential Walker
Process liability. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1553,
1616 (2006) (noting how “an innovator has an especially strong incentive to
pay to neutralize ... potential competition” when a generic manufacturer
first files an ANDA).
Although settlements between patent holders and generic manufacturers
that delay generic entry into the market may themselves invite antitrust
liability, a plaintiff must be able to show the settled litigation to have been a
sham in order to succeed. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208-09 (“In such a
case, so long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise
baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to
protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”). A purchaser
seeking to challenge the settlement by showing the underlying infringement
litigation to be a sham would need to attach antitrust liability to the patent
enforcement efforts-a move that would raise the same standing issues
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presented by this case. Thus, not only are there strong potential settlement
incentives, but these settlements could be shielded from purchaser attack….
On the other hand, we do not pass lightly over the defendants' objections
to expanding the universe of patent challengers. The risk of disturbing the
incentives for innovation dictates that we tread carefully. As a result, we
decline to decide whether purchaser plaintiffs per se have standing to raise
Walker Process claims. In this case, the plaintiffs are challenging an already
tarnished patent. We are able to grant them antitrust standing without
altering the typical limits on who can start a challenge to a patent's validity.
We therefore hold only that purchaser plaintiffs have standing to raise
Walker Process claims for patents that are already unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct. The district court erred by concluding to the contrary.
Granting standing to the plaintiffs does not resolve this appeal, because
the district court also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim. “We review the district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim de novo, accepting as true all facts alleged in the complaint
and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff....” Faulkner v. Beer, 463
F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). We believe that
the plaintiffs meet this standard for their antitrust claim under each of their
four theories.
Walker Process fraud, the plaintiffs' first theory, requires:
(1)

a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of
mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be
the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation by the party deceived which
induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party
deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation.

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-70. A fraudulent omission, which “can be
just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation,” can be sufficient to
“support a finding of Walker Process fraud.”
A party “alleging fraud or mistake ... must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The
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plaintiffs argue that they have pled each element with sufficient specificity.
They alleged a series of “highly material” omissions, without which “the ′
398 patent would not have issued.” The Federal Circuit agreed on the “high[
] material[ity]” of the omissions when it found the ′398 patent
unenforceable. Ferring I, 437 F.3d at 1194. The Ferring I litigation also
addressed the third element of intent, as the district court found “clear and
convincing evidence of an intent to mislead the examiners.” Ferring B.V.,
2005 WL 437981, at 9. Reliance and injury, the fourth and fifth elements,
are straightforward here: the PTO was justified in relying on the
information the defendants provided, and injury is a “matter of course
whenever the other four elements are met.” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2004), rev'd on other
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). Thus, the plaintiffs contend the district
court's dismissal on the pleadings was erroneous….
The defendants next argue that the plaintiffs must allege evidence of
intent distinct from the omission itself. While a false or clearly misleading
statement can permit an inference of deceptive intent, a misrepresentation in
the form of an omission is more likely to be innocent and cannot support
Walker Process fraud without “evidence of intent separable from the simple
fact of the omission.” Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347
(Fed.Cir.2007). The issue in the initial infringement litigation was
inequitable conduct, not Walker Process fraud. Moreover, the district court
in that litigation correctly noted that high materiality could overcome a
lesser showing of intent. Ferring B.V., 2005 WL 437981, at 9; see
Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380-81
(Fed.Cir.2001). While such balancing is impermissible with Walker Process
claims, we think the plaintiffs' allegations are nonetheless sufficient. Dippin'
Dots concerned findings, not pleadings, see 476 F.3d at 1341-42; even if the
district court's findings in the Ferring I litigation could not satisfy Dippin'
Dots, the plaintiffs' pleadings could plausibly lead to additional findings that
would satisfy Dippin' Dots, which is all that is required at this stage of the
litigation….
We likewise conclude that the sham litigation claim has been adequately
alleged. In order to state a claim for sham litigation, the plaintiffs need to
allege that “the litigation in question is: (i) ‘objectively baseless,’ and (ii)
‘an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor through the use of the governmental process ... as an
anticompetitive weapon.’ ” Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l
Broadcasting Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100-01 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Prof'l Real
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Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60
(1993)). Based on the same facts alleged to sustain a Walker Process claim,
we find that in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs' allegations are
also sufficient to make out a sham litigation claim. The defendants
effectively concede as much. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees Ferring
B.V. and Ferring Pharms. at 38 (“[A] sham litigation claim here not only
requires proof that defendants defrauded the PTO, but also that they knew
their misconduct before the PTO had rendered the patent invalid....
[Plaintiffs'] ‘sham’ litigation allegation is thus substantively duplicative of
their patent fraud claim....”).
Overall, the plaintiffs have stated an antitrust claim upon which
relief may be granted….
RITZ CAMERA & IMAGE, LLC v. SANDISK CORP.
700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
This case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. The certified question
concerns the limits on standing to bring so-called Walker Process antitrust
claims. The Supreme Court in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), held that antitrust
liability may attach when a party uses a patent to obtain or preserve a
monopoly if the patent was procured through intentional fraud on the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”). The question in this case is whether an
antitrust action against the owner of a patent, based on the Walker Process
theory of liability, can be brought by a direct purchaser of goods that are
protected by the patent, even if the purchaser faces no threat of an action for
patent infringement and has no other basis to seek a declaratory judgment
holding the patent invalid or unenforceable. We hold that the district court
was correct to rule that a direct purchaser is not categorically precluded
from bringing a Walker Process antitrust claim, even if it would not be
entitled to seek declaratory relief against the patentee under the patent laws.
Defendant SanDisk allegedly controls about three quarters of the
market for NAND flash memory. Flash memory is a computer chip that can
be erased and reprogrammed; NAND is a particular type of flash memory.
The capacity of NAND flash memory to store large amounts of data and to
rewrite the contents of that data has led to its widespread use in consumer
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products such as digital cameras, mobile phones, and USB drives. SanDisk
holds patent rights needed to make NAND products. With those patents,
SanDisk manufactures and sells flash memory products and also licenses
the technology to other manufacturers. Retailers such as plaintiff Ritz
Camera & Image, LLC, purchase flash memory products from SanDisk and
its licensees.
In June 2010, Ritz filed suit on behalf of itself and a class of direct
purchasers of NAND flash memory, alleging that SanDisk had violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. The complaint alleged that
SanDisk had fraudulently procured two patents central to its flash memory
business—U.S. Patent Nos. 5,172,338 and 5,991,517 (“the ′338 and ′517
patents”)—by failing to disclose known prior art and making affirmative
misrepresentations to the PTO. Ritz further alleged that SanDisk established
its monopoly position by enforcing those patents against its competitors and
by threatening the competitors' customers. Ritz contends that those actions
have caused direct purchasers to pay inflated, supracompetitive prices for
NAND flash memory products.
SanDisk moved to dismiss the complaint. Among its arguments,
SanDisk asserted that Ritz lacked standing to bring a Walker Process
antitrust claim based on the invalidity or unenforceability of SanDisk's
patents, because Ritz faced no threat of an infringement action and had no
other basis to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the patents.6
The district court rejected SanDisk's argument.
The court
acknowledged that Walker Process claims normally are brought by
competitors of the patentee as counter claims in patent infringement actions.
However, the court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Walker
Process “places no limitation on the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring
[such claims].” Moreover, the court was not persuaded by SanDisk's
6

The Supreme Court in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 127 (2007), rejected our “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for
declaratory judgment standing and held that the proper test is whether
“there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.” See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2007). Ritz does not claim that it could have
brought a declaratory judgment action against SanDisk seeking relief under
the patent laws.
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contention that expressly authorizing direct purchasers to bring Walker
Process claims “could result in an avalanche of patent challenges” because
such claims are “rare” and because the Supreme Court rejected the same
argument in Walker Process. In the course of its opinion, the court pointed
out that allegations of fraud relating to the ′338 and ′517 patents had
survived a motion for summary judgment in a different litigation, which
“raise[s] at least some question as to the validity of the subject patent[s].”...
SanDisk's appeal is limited to a single question: Whether direct
purchasers who cannot challenge a patent's validity or enforceability
through a declaratory judgment action (and have not been sued for
infringement, and so cannot assert invalidity or unenforceability as a
defense in the infringement action) may nevertheless bring a Walker
Process antitrust claim that includes as one of its elements the need to show
that the patent was procured through fraud. SanDisk contends that allowing
parties such as Ritz to use a Walker Process antitrust lawsuit to challenge
patents would represent an unjustifiable expansion of the Walker Process
doctrine and would undermine well-recognized limitations on standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action challenging a patent. We disagree.
Walker Process set forth two conditions for antitrust liability based
on the fraudulent procurement of a patent. First, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant procured the relevant patent by knowing and willful fraud on
the PTO or (in the case of an assignee) that the defendant maintained and
enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it
was obtained. Second, the plaintiff must prove all the elements otherwise
necessary to establish a Sherman Act monopolization charge.... With the
first condition, the Court made clear that the invalidity of the patent was not
sufficient; a showing of intentional fraud in its procurement was required.
With the second condition, the Court incorporated the rules of antitrust law
generally. As Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion, “as to this
class of improper patent monopolies, antitrust remedies should be allowed
room for full play.” The “full play” of antitrust remedies encompasses the
standing requirements that apply in the antitrust setting, see, e.g.,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537–46 (1983); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir.2009), including the recognition
that direct purchasers are not only eligible to sue under the antitrust laws,
but have been characterized as “preferred” antitrust plaintiffs.
Nothing in Walker Process supports SanDisk's argument that the
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rules governing standing to bring patent validity challenges should be
imported into an antitrust case simply because one element of the antitrust
cause of action requires proof of improper procurement of a patent. In fact,
the Supreme Court in Walker Process rejected an argument closely
analogous to SanDisk's argument here. The Court stated that it found no
merit in the proposition that rules defining who may bring suit “to cancel or
annul a patent” should also dictate the boundaries of antitrust standing.
Notwithstanding the fact that “one of its elements is the fraudulent
procurement of a patent,” the Court explained, an antitrust claim under the
Clayton Act is not a claim under the patent laws. Rather, “the gist of [the
antitrust] claim is that since [the defendant] obtained its patent by fraud it
cannot enjoy the limited exception to the prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman
Act, but must answer under that section and § 4 of the Clayton Act in treble
damages to those injured by any monopolistic action taken under the
fraudulent patent claim.” The Court did not suggest that the class of “those
injured by any monopolistic action” should be limited to those within that
class who would have standing to bring an independent challenge to the
patents at issue.
In arguing that the right to bring a Walker Process claim should be
governed by the standing requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act
rather than traditional antitrust standing requirements, SanDisk relies on the
Court's statement in Walker Process that permitting a plaintiff to bring an
antitrust claim based on a fraudulently procured patent “accords with ...
long-recognized procedures.” Because that statement follows a brief survey
of cases concerning patent validity disputes, SanDisk argues that it evinces
the Court's intent to limit the class of potential antitrust plaintiffs to those
who could contest a patent's validity directly. The quoted sentence,
however, does not say what SanDisk claims. The context makes clear that
the sentence in question simply explains that recognizing a cause of action
for an antitrust claim based on a fraudulently procured patent is not
inconsistent with patent law rules permitting challenges to patently validity
or patent misuse. Nothing in that sentence, or elsewhere in the Court's
opinion, suggests that the standing limitations on direct actions to challenge
patent validity should be imported into antitrust actions predicated on
fraudulently procured patents.
Noting the distinction between patent and antitrust actions drawn in
Walker Process, this court and others have declined to apply limitations on
patent invalidity suits to Walker Process antitrust actions. In Hydril Co. v.
Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.2007), this court refused to apply
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the standing limitation on declaratory judgment actions challenging a
patent's validity to the context of a Walker Process claim. Similarly, the
Second Circuit has held that direct purchasers had standing to pursue their
Walker Process claim despite the fact that, as purchasers, they could not
directly challenge the patent's validity.7 The D.C. Circuit has likewise
allowed a Walker Process claim to proceed even though the patentee had
disclaimed the patent and thus the plaintiff faced no risk of an infringement
suit. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1977). The rule
urged by SanDisk—to limit Walker Process antitrust claimants to
competitors who could bring a declaratory judgment action attacking a
patent's validity—would conflict with all of those decisions.
SanDisk argues that allowing direct purchasers to bring Walker
Process claims would authorize an intolerable end-run around the patent
laws because parties unable to pursue invalidity claims could achieve the
same result by way of a Sherman Act claim. We do not share SanDisk's
concern. A Walker Process antitrust claim is a separate cause of action from
a patent declaratory judgment action. It is governed by principles of
antitrust law, and there is nothing novel about the fact that it includes as one
of its elements the need to prove a violation that is not independently
actionable between the same parties. Walker Process explained that while
one of the elements of the antitrust claim is the fraudulent procurement of a
patent, the action “does not directly seek the patent's annulment.” Ritz's
claim likewise seeks relief under the antitrust laws; it does not directly seek
to invalidate SanDisk's patents or render them unenforceable, even though
7

[In

re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d
Cir.2009)], The Second Circuit “decline[d] to decide whether purchaser
plaintiffs per se have standing to raise Walker Process claims,” and held
“only that purchaser plaintiffs have standing to raise Walker Process claims
for patents that are already unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.” 585
F.3d at 691–92. The district court in this case noted that claims of
intentional fraud against the ′338 and ′ 517 patents had previously survived
a motion for summary judgment in another case. We see no reason to limit
the scope of Walker Process standing to cases in which the patents have
been “tarnished” in another proceeding. Walker Process contains no such
limitation, and applying such a requirement would have the undesirable
effect of subjecting injured parties' claims to the litigation strategies of
others. It would also be likely to generate unproductive wrangling over
what counts as a sufficiently “tarnished” patent to support a Walker Process
claim.
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that would likely be the practical effect if Ritz were to prevail on its Walker
Process claim.
Moreover, as to SanDisk's assertion that granting standing to direct
purchasers would trigger a flood of litigation and stem innovation, the
Supreme Court rejected the same argument in Walker Process when it
explained that “the interest in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable
vexatious suits' [cannot] be used to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred
by the antitrust laws.” As the Court explained, Walker Process claims “deal
only with a special class of patents, i.e., those procured by intentional
fraud,” and “cannot well be thought to impinge upon the policy of the
patent laws to encourage inventions and their disclosure,” (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Particularly in light of the demanding proof requirements of a
Walker Process claim, we are not persuaded by SanDisk's “flood of
litigation” argument.
In sum, Walker Process recognizes a clear distinction between
claims that arise under the antitrust laws and those that arise under the
patent laws. Because direct purchasers are generally permitted to bring
antitrust actions, and because the Walker Process decision did not preclude
purchasers from bringing this particular type of antitrust claim, we hold that
Ritz's status as a direct purchaser gives it standing to pursue its Walker
Process claim even if it could not have sought a declaratory judgment of
patent invalidity or unenforceability.
AFFIRMED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Why shouldn't customers of a patented product have a general right
to challenge the validity of a patent when they are paying an overcharge or
suffering a loss in product variety as a result? One answer, of course, is that
the Patent Act contains no equivalent to §4 of the Clayton Act, which
permits any "person who shall be injured" by an antitrust violation to sue
for damages. The Declaratory Judgment Action is not a good substitute
because it requires an "actual controversy." 28 U.S.C. §2201. What of the
fact that an ongoing customer of a patented good acquires an implied
license to use any incorporated patents. A licensee generally does have
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a
licensed patent, although the cases have generally involved manufacturing
licensees, not simply product purchasers. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). The difference between such a challenge and an
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antitrust challenge such as the one in Ritz Camera could be significant. The
antitrust plaintiffs in Ritz must still make out all of the other elements of an
antitrust violation, including monopoly power, which typically requires
costly definition of a relevant market. By contrast, a simple validity
challenge requires only a showing that a patent is not enforceable.
2. Under Ritz a plaintiff's burden could still be substantial. See, e.g.,
the Federal Circuit's decision in Therasense, reprinted infra.
3. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a
final decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of
that court was based in whole or part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.” 28 U.S.C.
1295(a)(1). Section 1338 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over
patent cases. 28. U.S.C. 1338(a). This, even in cases involving both patent
and non-patent claims, the Federal Circuit will have exclusive jurisdiction if
a patent law claim appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
complaint. See Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 808-09 (1998).
However, if assertion of a fraudulent patent is an act of
monopolization, then one would anticipate that consumers must pay higher
prices. Further antitrust’s private action provision, §4 of the Clayton Act,
gives a claim to “any person” who is injured by an antitrust violation. 15
U.S.C. §15. Since customers are typically not the targets of infringement
actions, the case does not “arise” under the Patent Act and the appeal will
go to the regional Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit.
4. “Reverse Payment” settlements make a particularly strong case for
granting standing to consumers, do they not. The issue of reverse payment
settlements is discussed further in the notes after the Arkansas Carpenters
Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. 2010),
reprinted infra. Suppose the patentee of a drug, Alpha, files a patent
infringement suit against the only plausible rival, Beta, and the two settle
the dispute by an arrangement under which the patentee pays the rival not to
produce the patented product. If the patent is invalid the two firms have
effectively agreed to divide up a monopoly, just as a cartel would, rather
than competing with each other. That leaves consumers as the most likely
private challengers.
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THERASENSE, INC. V. BECTON, DICKINSON AND CO.
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
RADER,Chief Judge.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
found U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (“the '551 patent”) unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct…. The ′551 involves disposable blood glucose test
strips for diabetes management. These strips employ electrochemical
sensors to measure the level of glucose in a sample of blood. When blood
contacts a test strip, glucose in the blood reacts with an enzyme on the strip,
resulting in the transfer of electrons from the glucose to the enzyme. A
mediator transfers these electrons to an electrode on the strip. Then, the
electrons flow from the strip to a glucose meter, which calculates the
glucose concentration based on the electrical current…..
Abbott filed the original application leading to the ′551 patent in 1984.
Over thirteen years, that original application saw multiple rejections for
anticipation and obviousness…. [During this time Abbott through its agents
made claims in the United States patent proceedings that were inconsistent
with factual assertions it made in claims before the European Patent Office
[EPO]; this inconsistency was the basis of the inequitable conduct claim. –
ed.]
Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if
proved, bars enforcement of a patent. This judge-made doctrine evolved
from a trio of Supreme Court cases that applied the doctrine of unclean
hands to dismiss patent cases involving egregious misconduct: Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933), Hazel–Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other
grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976),
and Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
Keystone involved the manufacture and suppression of evidence. 290 U.S.
at 243. The patentee knew of “a possible prior use” by a third party prior to
filing a patent application but did not inform the PTO. Id. at 243. After the
issuance of the patent, the patentee paid the prior user to sign a false
affidavit stating that his use was an abandoned experiment and bought his
agreement to keep secret the details of the prior use and to suppress
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evidence….
The Supreme Court explained that if the corrupt transaction between the
patentee and the prior user had been discovered… “the court undoubtedly
would have been warranted in holding it sufficient to require dismissal” [of
a subsequent infringement suit].
Like Keystone, Hazel–Atlas involved both the manufacture and
suppression of evidence. 322 U.S. at 240. Faced with “apparently
insurmountable Patent Office opposition,” the patentee's attorneys wrote an
article describing the invention as a remarkable advance in the art and had
William Clarke, a well-known expert, sign it as his own and publish it in a
trade journal. After the patentee submitted the Clarke article to the PTO in
support of its application, the PTO allowed a patent to issue.
The patentee brought suit against Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. (“Hazel–Atlas”),
alleging infringement of this patent. The district court found no
infringement. On appeal, the patentee's attorneys emphasized the Clarke
article, and the Third Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding
the patent valid and infringed. The patentee then went to great lengths to
conceal the false authorship of the Clarke article, contacting Clarke multiple
times, including before and after Hazel–Atlas's investigators spoke to
him. After Hazel–Atlas settled with the patentee, the patentee paid Clarke a
total of $8,000. These facts surfaced in a later suit.
On the basis of these newly-discovered facts, Hazel–Atlas petitioned the
Third Circuit to vacate its judgment, but the court refused. The Supreme
Court reversed. The Supreme Court explained that if the district court had
learned of the patentee's deception before the PTO, it would have been
warranted in dismissing the patentee's case under the doctrine of unclean
hands. … Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against
Hazel–Atlas and reinstated the original judgment dismissing the patentee's
case.
In Precision, the patentee suppressed evidence of perjury before the PTO
and attempted to enforce the perjury-tainted patent….
The district court found that Automotive had unclean hands and dismissed
the suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit's decision, explaining that dismissal was warranted because
not only had the patentee failed to disclose its knowledge of perjury to the
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PTO, it had actively suppressed evidence of the perjury and magnified its
effects.
The unclean hands cases of Keystone, Hazel–Atlas, and Precision formed
the basis for a new doctrine of inequitable conduct that developed and
evolved over time. Each of these unclean hands cases before the Supreme
Court dealt with particularly egregious misconduct, including perjury, the
manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of evidence…. As the
inequitable conduct doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it
came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only
egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO
and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO.
Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by
adopting a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire
patent rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.
In line with this wider scope and stronger remedy, inequitable conduct
came to require a finding of both intent to deceive and materiality. Star
Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed.Cir.2008). To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, the
accused infringer must prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted
material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. The
accused infringer must prove both elements—intent and materiality—by
clear and convincing evidence. If the accused infringer meets its burden,
then the district court must weigh the equities to determine whether the
applicant's conduct before the PTO warrants rendering the entire patent
unenforceable….
As inequitable conduct emerged from unclean hands, the standards for
intent to deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time. In the past, this
court has espoused low standards for meeting the intent requirement,
finding it satisfied based on gross negligence or even
negligence. See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed.Cir.
1984) (“Where they knew, or should have known, that the withheld
reference would be material to the PTO's consideration, their failure to
disclose the reference is sufficient proof of the existence of an intent to
mislead the PTO.”); Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1383–84 (Fed.Cir.1983) (requiring only
gross negligence to sustain a finding of intent). This court has also
previously adopted a broad view of materiality, using a “reasonable
examiner” standard based on the PTO's 1977 amendment to Rule
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56. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362
(Fed.Cir.1984); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (a reference is material if
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider
it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent”). Further weakening the showing needed to establish inequitable
conduct, this court then placed intent and materiality together on a “sliding
scale.” Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362. This modification to the inequitable
conduct doctrine held patents unenforceable based on a reduced showing of
intent if the record contained a strong showing of materiality, and vice
versa. In effect, this change conflated, and diluted, the standards for both
intent and materiality.
This court embraced these reduced standards for intent and materiality to
foster full disclosure to the PTO. This new focus on encouraging disclosure
has had numerous unforeseen and unintended consequences. Most
prominently, inequitable conduct has become a significant litigation
strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct conveniently expands discovery
into corporate practices before patent filing and disqualifies the prosecuting
attorney from the patentee's litigation team. Moreover, inequitable conduct
charges cast a dark cloud over the patent's validity and paint the patentee as
a bad actor. Because the doctrine focuses on the moral turpitude of the
patentee with ruinous consequences for the reputation of his patent attorney,
it discourages settlement and deflects attention from the merits of validity
and infringement issues…. Inequitable conduct disputes also “increas[e] the
complexity, duration and cost of patent infringement litigation that is
already notorious for its complexity and high cost.” Brief and Appendix of
the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 9.
Perhaps most importantly, the remedy for inequitable conduct is the
“atomic bomb” of patent law. Unlike validity defenses, which are claim
specific, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire
patent unenforceable. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister
Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.Cir.1988). Unlike other deficiencies,
inequitable conduct cannot be cured by reissue, Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1341,
n. 6, or reexamination, Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182
(Fed.Cir.1995). Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents
and applications in the same technology family. See, e.g., Consol.
Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808–12 (Fed.Cir.1990).
Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct may endanger a substantial portion
of a company's patent portfolio.
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A finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn antitrust and unfair
competition claims. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470,
1471 (Fed.Cir.1998) (unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (antitrust
action for treble damages). Further, prevailing on a claim of inequitable
conduct often makes a case “exceptional,” leading potentially to an award
of attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker
Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2001). A finding of inequitable
conduct may also prove the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807
(Fed.Cir.2000).
With these far-reaching consequences, it is no wonder that charging
inequitable conduct has become a common litigation tactic. One study
estimated that eighty percent of patent infringement cases included
allegations of inequitable conduct. Committee Position Paper at 75; see
also Christian Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine
of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358 (2009)…..
While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and
materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences,
among them, increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced
likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased
PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality. This court now tightens the
standards for finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a
doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public.
To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must
prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the
PTO. Star, 537 F.3d at 1366 (citing Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876). A finding
that the misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or
negligence under a “should have known” standard does not satisfy this
intent requirement. “In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear
and convincing evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate
decision to withhold a known material reference.” In other words, the
accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a
deliberate decision to withhold it….
Intent and materiality are separate requirements. Hoffmann–La Roche,
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Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2003). A district court
should not use a “sliding scale,” where a weak showing of intent may be
found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice versa.
Moreover, a district court may not infer intent solely from materiality.
Instead, a court must weigh the evidence of intent to deceive independent of
its analysis of materiality. Proving that the applicant knew of a reference,
should have known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the
PTO does not prove specific intent to deceive.
Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may
infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence. However, to meet the
clear and convincing evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must
be “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
evidence.” Indeed, the evidence “must be sufficient to require a finding of
deceitful intent in the light of all the circumstances.” Hence, when there are
multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot
be found.
Because the party alleging inequitable conduct bears the burden of proof,
the “patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the accused
infringer first ... prove[s] a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and
convincing evidence.” The absence of a good faith explanation for
withholding a material reference does not, by itself, prove intent to deceive.
This court holds that, as a general matter, the materiality required to
establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an applicant fails
to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior
art. Hence, in assessing the materiality of a withheld reference, the court
must determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim if it had
been aware of the undisclosed reference. In making this patentability
determination, the court should apply the preponderance of the evidence
standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction. Often the
patentability of a claim will be congruent with the validity determination—
if a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately
withheld reference, then that reference is necessarily material because a
finding of invalidity in a district court requires clear and convincing
evidence, a higher evidentiary burden than that used in prosecution at the
PTO. However, even if a district court does not invalidate a claim based on
a deliberately withheld reference, the reference may be material if it would
have blocked patent issuance under the PTO's different evidentiary
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standards.
As an equitable doctrine, inequitable conduct hinges on basic fairness.
“[T]he remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with
the violation.” Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979).
Because inequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent
family) unenforceable, as a general rule, this doctrine should only be
applied in instances where the patentee's misconduct resulted in the unfair
benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim. Star, 537 F.3d at 1366 (“[j]ust as
it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his patent through
deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of material information to
enforce the patent against others, it is also inequitable to strike down an
entire patent where the patentee committed only minor missteps or acted
with minimal culpability”). After all, the patentee obtains no advantage
from misconduct if the patent would have issued anyway…..
In this case, the district court held the ′551 patent unenforceable for
inequitable conduct because Abbott did not disclose briefs it submitted to
the EPO regarding the European counterpart of the ′382 patent. Trial
Opinion at 1127. Because the district court found statements made in the
EPO briefs material under the PTO's Rule 56 materiality standard, not under
the but-for materiality standard set forth in this opinion, this court vacates
the district court's findings of materiality. On remand, the district court
should determine whether the PTO would not have granted the patent but
for Abbott's failure to disclose the EPO briefs…..
The district court found intent to deceive based on the absence of a good
faith explanation for failing to disclose the EPO briefs. However, a
“patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the accused
infringer first ... prove[s] a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and
convincing evidence.” The district court also relied upon the “should have
known” negligence standard in reaching its finding of intent…. Because
the district court did not find intent to deceive under the knowing and
deliberate standard set forth in this opinion, this court vacates the district
court's findings of intent. On remand, the district court should determine
whether there is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that [the
United States applicant] knew of the EPO briefs, knew of their materiality,
and made the conscious decision not to disclose them in order to deceive the
PTO…..
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson took issue with the majority’s
standard for determining whether the conduct at issue is sufficiently
material to render the patent suit unenforceable. Judge Bryson pointed out
that:
Since its first days, this court has looked to the PTO's disclosure
rule, Rule 56, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, as the standard for defining
materiality in inequitable conduct cases involving the failure to
disclose material information. In its current form, that rule provides
that information is material not only if it establishes a prima facie
case of unpatentability, but also if it refutes or is inconsistent with a
position the applicant takes before the PTO with respect to
patentability. Id. at 22.
Judge Bryson argued that the PTO’s materiality standard set for in
its disclosure rule should be followed because, “ the PTO is in the best
position to know what information examiners need to conduct effective and
efficient examinations,” and that, “the higher standard of materiality
adopted by the majority will not provide appropriate incentives for patent
applicants to comply with the disclosure obligations the PTO places upon
them.” Id. at 22. Moreover, citing Rule 56’s legislative history:
At the time it adopted the 1992 revision to Rule 56, the PTO
considered the possibility of adopting a “but for” test of
materiality of the sort that the majority has adopted today. The
Office rejected that test, concluding that adopting such a narrow
standard “would not cause the Office to obtain the information it
needs to evaluate patentability so that its decisions may be
presumed correct by the courts.” Duty of Disclosure, 57
Fed.Reg. at 2023. Id. at 31.
Additionally, argued Judge Bryson, the majority “does not merely
reform the doctrine of inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it
altogether.” Id. at 24. In reference to the majority’s new standard, he states,
“[t]his court has repeatedly rejected the ‘but for’ test as too restrictive in
light of the policies served by the inequitable conduct doctrine.”
2. The proper role of equity courts. Judge O’Malley also wrote a separate
opinion. He argued that “when addressing the types of conduct that should
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be deemed of sufficient concern to allow for a finding of inequitable
conduct, both the majority and dissent strain too hard to impose hard and
fast rules.” Judge O’Malley offered the following test for materiality:
(1) but for the conduct (whether it be in the form of an
affirmative act or intentional non-disclosure), the patent would
not have issued (as Chief Judge Rader explains that concept in
the majority opinion); (2) the conduct constitutes a false or
misleading representation of fact (rendered so either because the
statement made is false on its face or information is omitted
which, if known, would render the representation false or
misleading); or (3) the district court finds that the behavior is so
offensive that the court is left with a firm conviction that the
integrity of the PTO process as to the application at issue was
wholly undermined.
Judge O’Malley refused to weigh in on the policy debate between
the majority and dissenters concerning litigation abuses surrounding the
improper use of the inequitable conduct doctrine. “Policy concerns cannot
… justify adopting broad legal standards that diverge from doctrines
explicated by the Supreme Court.”
EON-NET LP v. FLAGSTAR BANCORP
653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
… [T]he district court found that Eon–Net's litigation misconduct and
its filing of a baseless infringement action in bad faith for an improper
purpose warranted an exceptional case finding. We conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in so finding and address each category of conduct
below.
Litigation Misconduct
The district court's opinion recounted numerous instances of litigation
misconduct. First, the district court found that Eon–Net and its counsel
destroyed relevant documents prior to the initiation of its lawsuit against
Flagstar and that Eon–Net intentionally did not implement a document
retention plan. Exceptional Case Order, at 17–18. As recounted by the
district court, Eon–Net's principal, Mitchell Medina, testified with regard to
document retention, collection, and production that “I don't save anything
so I don't have to look” and further testified that Eon–Net and Millennium
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“have adopted a document retention policy which is that we don't retain any
documents” because those companies have “evolved into patent
enforcement companies which are involved in the business of litigation.” …
it is undisputed that Medina and ultimately Eon–Net had an independent
duty to preserve evidence during the ongoing lawsuits, see Sensonics, Inc. v.
Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1996), and, in light of
Medina's testimony, it was not clear error for the district court to conclude
that Eon–Net did not observe that duty.
Filing Objectively Baseless Litigation in Bad Faith
Eon–Net also challenges the district court's finding that Eon–Net
pursued baseless infringement allegations in bad faith and for an improper
purpose….
... [T]he written description repeatedly defines the invention as a system
for processing information that originates from hard copy documents, and,
under this construction, it is undisputed that Flagstar does not infringe any
asserted claim of the ′697, ′673, and ′162 patents. Thus, because the written
description clearly refutes Eon–Net's claim construction, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that Eon–Net pursued objectively baseless
infringement claims…..
In addition to finding that Eon–Net filed an objectively baseless
infringement action, the district court also determined that Eon–Net filed
the lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose. Exceptional Case
Order, at 16–17. In particular, the district court found that Eon–Net's case
against Flagstar had “indicia of extortion” because it was part of Eon–Net's
history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints against a
plethora of diverse defendants, where Eon–Net followed each filing with a
demand for a quick settlement at a price far lower than the cost to defend
the litigation.
The record supports the district court's finding that Eon–Net acted in bad
faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a
nuisance value settlement from Flagstar. At the time that the district court
made its exceptional case finding, Eon–Net and its related entities,
Millennium and Glory, had filed over 100 lawsuits against a number of
diverse defendants alleging infringement of one or more patents from the
Patent Portfolio. Each complaint was followed by a “demand for a quick
settlement at a price far lower than the cost of litigation, a demand to which

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 53
August 2013

most defendants apparently have agreed.” In this case, as with the other
cases, Eon–Net offered to settle using a license fee schedule based on the
defendant's annual sales: $25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000; $50,000
for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000 for sales
between $20,000,000 and $100,000,000. Rule 11 Sanctions Order, at 3–4.
Meritless cases like this one unnecessarily require the district court to
engage in excessive claim construction analysis before it is able to see the
lack of merit of the patentee's infringement allegations. … In this case,
Flagstar expended over $600,000 in attorney fees and costs to litigate this
case through claim construction. Viewed against Eon–Net's $25,000 to
$75,000 settlement offer range, it becomes apparent why the vast majority
of those that Eon–Net accused of infringement chose to settle early in the
litigation rather than expend the resources required to demonstrate to a court
that the asserted patents are limited to processing information that originates
from a hard copy document. Thus, those low settlement offers—less than
ten percent of the cost that Flagstar expended to defend suit—effectively
ensured that Eon–Net's baseless infringement allegations remained
unexposed, allowing Eon–Net to continue to collect additional nuisance
value settlements….
In addition to its ability to impose high costs to defend against its
meritless claims, Eon–Net placed little at risk when filing suit. As a nonpracticing entity, Eon–Net was generally immune to counterclaims for
patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition because it did not
engage in business activities that would potentially give rise to those claims.
And while Eon–Net risked licensing revenue should its patents be found
invalid or if a court narrowly construed the patents' claims to exclude
valuable targets, Eon–Net did not face any business risk resulting from the
loss of patent protection over a product or process. Its patents protected only
settlement receipts, not its own products.
Eon–Net argues that it is not improper for a patentee to vigorously
enforce its patent rights or offer standard licensing terms, and Eon–Net is
correct. But the appetite for licensing revenue cannot overpower a litigant's
and its counsel's obligation to file cases reasonably based in law and fact
and to litigate those cases in good faith. Here, the district court did not
clearly err when it found that Eon–Net filed an objectively baseless
infringement action against Flagstar and brought that action in bad faith,
specifically to extract a nuisance value settlement by exploiting the high
cost imposed on Flagstar to defend against Eon–Net's baseless claims. It
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also appears that in filing this case, Zimmerman merely followed the
direction of his client, Medina, who Zimmerman characterized at oral
argument as “difficult to control.” But an attorney, in addition to his
obligation to his client, also has an obligation to the court and should not
blindly follow the client's interests if not supported by law and facts. In
these circumstances, coupled with the district court's supported findings
regarding Eon–Net's litigation misconduct, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in its exceptional case finding.
Rule 11 Sanctions
Eon–Net also appeals the district court's imposition of Rule
11 sanctions. We apply the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth
Circuit, to review an award of Rule 11 sanctions. Power Mosfet Techs.,
L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1406–07 (Fed.Cir.2004). Before a
district court awards Rule 11 sanctions under Ninth Circuit law, the district
court must determine that the complaint is “legally or factually ‘baseless'
from an objective perspective” and that the attorney failed to conduct a
“reasonable and competent inquiry” before filing the complaint. Christian v.
Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Buster v.
Greisen,104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.1997)). We review all aspects of a
district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion
standard. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
The district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Zimmerman and
Eon–Net because it found that Eon–Net's infringement allegations were
legally baseless and that Eon–Net and Zimmerman failed to perform a
reasonable pre-suit investigation. Eon–Net argues that its claim construction
was not objectively baseless. As explained above, however, the district
court did not clearly err in concluding that Eon–Net's infringement
allegations were objectively baseless, and, for the same reasons, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Eon–Net's infringement
allegations were legally baseless.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Suppose a patent holder came to you intending to file a patent
infringement suit against a competitor. After review of the relevant
document available at the time, you decide the case does have merit and
submit the complaint. However, since litigation, like life, never goes
according to plan, new evidence is brought to your attention during the
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discovery process that seriously calls into question the validity of your
client’s patent. What would you do with this new information? Do you
have a duty to disclose this evidence to opposing counsel? Would any of
your answers change if you were the attorney who drafted the patent
application? See Rule 26(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The “exceptional case” procedure emanates from the Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. §285, which states that “The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party.” The rule can be applied
to either party. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267
F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001); and see Christopher A. Cotropia,
Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY
TECH.L.J. 723 (2009).
3. Attorney-Client Privilege. In this case, both EON-Net and its counsel
destroyed documents relevant to litigation, a clear violation of both
discovery and ethics rules. However, whether or not attorney-client
communication is privileged is a very common discovery issue in patent
infringement litigation. Why might you think this is such a common
occurrence? Whatever the reason may be, when faced with this issue, the
court has the challenge of balancing the need for discovery against the
policy “encourag[ing] full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interest in the observance
of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981).
Additionally, what if you client tells you information that may call
into question the validity of their patent? Is that communication protected or
will you be obligated to disclose the information to opposing counsel?
Additionally, what if the patent holder discloses that he did in fact engage in
fraudulent conduct in his dealings with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Would your answer change if he initially acted fraudulently but has since
stopped? What if he stopped his conduct but the impact of his actions is still
occurring? On how lawyers respond to these and related issues, see
William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of Law: an
Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 JOHN MARSHALL REV.
INTEL.PROP.L. 309 (2011).
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RAMBUS, INC. v.. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008)
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge:
Rambus Inc. develops computer memory technologies, secures
intellectual property rights over them, and then licenses them to
manufacturers in exchange for royalty payments. In 1990, Rambus's
founders filed a patent application claiming the invention of a faster
architecture for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”). In recent
years, Rambus has asserted that patents issued to protect its invention cover
four technologies that a private standard-setting organization (“SSO”)
included in DRAM industry standards.
Before an SSO adopts a standard, there is often vigorous competition
among different technologies for incorporation into that standard. After
standardization, however, the dynamic typically shifts, as industry members
begin adhering to the standard and the standardized features start to
dominate. In this case, 90% of DRAM production is compliant with the
standards at issue, and therefore the technologies adopted in those
standards-including those over which Rambus claims patent rights-enjoy a
similar level of dominance over their alternatives.
After lengthy proceedings, the Federal Trade Commission determined that
Rambus, while participating in the standard-setting process, deceptively
failed to disclose to the SSO the patent interests it held in four technologies
that were standardized. Those interests ranged from issued patents, to
pending patent applications, to plans to amend those patent applications to
add new claims; Rambus's patent rights in all these interests are said to be
sufficiently connected to the invention described in Rambus's original 1990
application that its rights would relate back to its date.
Rambus petitions for review. We grant the petition, holding that the
Commission failed to sustain its allegation of monopolization. Its factual
conclusion was that Rambus's alleged deception enabled it either to acquire
a monopoly through the standardization of its patented technologies rather
than possible alternatives, or to avoid limits on its patent licensing fees that
the SSO would have imposed as part of its normal process of standardizing
patented technologies. But the latter-deceit merely enabling a monopolist to
charge higher prices than it otherwise could have charged-would not in
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itself constitute monopolization. We also address whether there is
substantial evidence that Rambus engaged in deceptive conduct at all, and
express our serious concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence on two
particular points.
***
During the early 1990s, the computer hardware industry faced a “memory
bottleneck”: the development of faster memory lagged behind the
development of faster central processing units, and this risked limiting
future gains in overall computer performance. To address this problem,
Michael Farmwald and Mark Horowitz began collaborating during the late
1980s and invented a higher-performance DRAM architecture. Together,
they founded Rambus in March 1990 and filed Patent Application No.
07/510,898 (“the ′898 application”) on April 18, 1990.
As originally filed, the ′898 application included a 62-page written
description of Farmwald and Horowitz's invention, 150 claims, and 15
technical drawings. Under the direction of the Patent Office, acting pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 121, Rambus effectively split the application into several
(the original one and 10 “ divisionals”). Thereafter, Rambus amended some
of these applications and filed additional continuation and divisional
applications.
While Rambus was developing a patent portfolio based on its founders'
inventions, the computer memory industry was at work standardizing
DRAM technologies. The locus of those efforts was the Joint Electron
Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”)-then an “activity” of what is now
called the Electronics Industries Alliance (“EIA”) and, since 2000, a trade
association affiliated with EIA and known as the JEDEC Solid State
Technology Association. Any company involved in the solid state products
industry could join JEDEC by submitting an application and paying annual
dues, and members could receive JEDEC mailings, participate
in JEDEC committees, and vote on pending matters.
One JEDEC committee, JC 42.3, developed standards for computer
memory products. Rambus attended its first JC 42.3 meeting as a guest in
December 1991 and began formally participating when it joined JEDEC in
February 1992. At the time, JC 42.3 was at work on what
became JEDEC's synchronous DRAM (“SDRAM”) standard. The
committee voted to approve the completed standard in March 1993,
and JEDEC's governing body gave its final approval on May 24, 1993. The
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SDRAM standard includes two of the four technologies over which Rambus
asserts patent rights-programmable CAS latency and programmable burst
length.
Despite SDRAM's standardization, its manufacture increased very slowly
and asynchronous DRAM continued to dominate the computer memory
market, so JC 42.3 began to consider a number of possible responses-among
them specifications it could include in a next-generation SDRAM standard.
As part of that process, JC 42.3 members received a survey ballot in
October 1995 soliciting their opinions on features of an advanced SDRAMwhich ultimately emerged as the double data rate (“DDR”) SDRAM
standard. Among the features voted on were the other two technologies at
issue here: on-chip phase lock and delay lock loops (“on-chip PLL/DLL”)
and dual-edge clocking. The Committee tallied and discussed the survey
results at its December 1995 meeting, which was Rambus's last as
a JEDEC member. Rambus formally withdrew from JEDEC by letter dated
June 17, 1996, saying (among other things) that the terms on which it
proposed to license its proprietary technology “may not be consistent with
the terms set by standards bodies, including JEDEC.” Complaint Counsel's
Exhibit (“CX”) 887.
JC 42.3's work continued after Rambus's departure. In March 1998 the
committee adopted the DDR SDRAM standard, and the JEDEC Board of
Directors approved it in 1999. This standard retained SDRAM features
including programmable CAS latency and programmable burst length, and
it added on-chip PLL/DLL and dual-edge clocking; DDR SDRAM,
therefore, included all four of the technologies at issue here.
Starting in 1999, Rambus informed major DRAM and chipset
manufacturers that it held patent rights over technologies included in
JEDEC's SDRAM and DDR SDRAM standards, and that the continued
manufacture, sale, or use of products compliant with those standards
infringed its rights. It invited the manufacturers to resolve the alleged
infringement through licensing negotiations. A number of manufacturers
agreed to licenses, see Opinion of the Commission (“Liability Op.”), In re
Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at 48 n. 262 (July 31, 2006) (discussing cases);
others did not, and litigation ensued, see id. at 17-21.
On June 18, 2002, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint under
§ 5(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), charging that Rambus engaged in
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
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violation of the Act, see id. § 45(a). Specifically, the Commission alleged
that Rambus breached JEDEC policies requiring it to disclose patent
interests related to standardization efforts and that the disclosures it did
make were misleading. By this deceptive conduct, it said, Rambus
unlawfully monopolized four technology markets in which its patented
technologies compete with alternative innovations to address technical
issues relating to DRAM design-markets for latency, burst length, data
acceleration, and clock synchronization technologies.
Proceedings began before an administrative law judge, who in due course
dismissed the Complaint in its entirety. Initial Decision (“ALJ Op.”) at 334
(Feb. 23, 2004). He concluded that Rambus did not impermissibly withhold
material information about its intellectual property, id. at 260-86, and that,
in any event, there was insufficient evidence that, if Rambus had disclosed
all the information allegedly required of it, JEDEC would have standardized
an alternative technology.
Complaint Counsel appealed the ALJ's Initial Decision to the
Commission, which reopened the record to receive additional evidence and
did its own plenary review. See Liability Op. at 17, 21. On July 31, 2006 the
Commission vacated the ALJ's decision and set aside his findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Id. at 21. The Commission found that
while JEDEC's patent disclosure policies were “not a model of
clarity,” id. at 52, members expected one another to disclose patents and
patent applications that were relevant to technologies being considered for
standardization, plus (though the Commission was far less clear on these
latter items) planned amendments to pending applications or “anything
they're working on that they potentially wanted to protect with patents down
the road,” id. at 56; see generally id. at 51-59, 66. Based on this
interpretation of JEDEC's disclosure requirements, the Commission held
that Rambus willfully and intentionally engaged in misrepresentations,
omissions, and other practices that misled JEDEC members about
intellectual property information “highly material” to the standard-setting
process. Id. at 68; see also id. at 37-48 (outlining Rambus's “Chronology of
Concealment”).
The Commission focused entirely on the allegation of monopolization. In
particular, the Commission held that the evidence and inferences from
Rambus's purpose demonstrated that “but for Rambus's deceptive course of
conduct, JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus's patented
technologies from the JEDEC DRAM standards, or would have demanded

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 60
August 2013

RAND assurances [ i.e.,assurances of ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory’
license fees], with an opportunity for ex ante licensing negotiations.” Id. at
74; see also id. at 77, 118-19. Rejecting Rambus's argument that factors
other than JEDEC's standards allowed Rambus's technologies to dominate
their respective markets, id. at 79-96, the Commission concluded that
Rambus's deception of JEDEC “significantly contributed to its acquisition
of monopoly power,” id. at 118.
After additional briefing by the parties, see id. at 119-20, the Commission
rendered a separate remedial opinion and final order. It held that it had the
authority in principle to order compulsory licensing, but that remedies
beyond injunctions against future anticompetitive conduct would require
stronger proof that they were necessary to restore competitive conditions.
Remedy Op. at 2-11. Applying that more demanding burden to Complaint
Counsel's claims for relief, the Commission refused to compel Rambus to
license its relevant patents royalty-free because there was insufficient
evidence that “absent Rambus's deception” JEDEC would have
standardized non-proprietary technologies instead of Rambus's; thus,
Complaint Counsel had failed to show that such a remedy was “necessary to
restore competition that would have existed in the ‘but for’ world.” Id. at
12; see also id. at 13, 16. Instead, the Commission decided to compel
licensing at “reasonable royalty rates,” which it calculated based on what it
believed would have resulted from negotiations between Rambus and
manufacturers before JEDEC committed to the standards. Id. at 16-25. The
Commission's order limits Rambus's royalties for three years to 0.25% for
JEDEC-compliant SDRAM and 0.5% for JEDEC-compliant DDR SDRAM
(with double those royalties for certain JEDEC-compliant, non-DRAM
products); after those three years, it forbids any royalty collection….
Rambus challenges the Commission's determination that it engaged in
unlawful monopolization-and thereby violated § 5 of the FTC Act-on a
variety of grounds, of which two are most prominent. First, it argues that
the Commission erred in finding that it violated any JEDEC patent
disclosure rules and thus that it breached any antitrust duty to provide
information to its rivals. Second, it asserts that even if its nondisclosure
contravened JEDEC's policies, the Commission found the consequences of
such
nondisclosure
only
in
the
alternative:
that
it
prevented JEDEC either from adopting a non-proprietary standard, or from
extracting a RAND commitment from Rambus when standardizing its
technology. As the latter would not involve an antitrust violation, says
Rambus, there is an insufficient basis for liability.
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We find the second of these arguments to be persuasive, and conclude that
the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus's conduct was
exclusionary under settled principles of antitrust law. Given that conclusion,
we need not dwell very long on the substantiality of the evidence, which we
address only to express our serious concerns about the breadth the
Commission ascribed to JEDEC's disclosure policies and their relation to
what Rambus did or did not disclose.
***
In this case under § 5 of the FTC Act, the Commission expressly limited
its theory of liability to Rambus's unlawful monopolization of four markets
in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. See Liability Op. at
27 n. 124; see also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (§ 5 reaches
all conduct that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act). Therefore, we apply
principles of antitrust law developed under the Sherman Act, and we review
the Commission's construction and application of the antitrust laws de novo.
It is settled law that the mere existence of a monopoly does not violate
the Sherman Act. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C.Cir.2001) (en banc) ( per curiam ). In addition
to “the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,” the offense
of monopolization requires “ ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historical accident.’ ” Trinko, 540
U.S. at 407 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966)); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 (same). In this case, Rambus does not
dispute the nature of the relevant markets or that its patent rights in the four
relevant technologies give it monopoly power in each of those markets. The
critical question is whether Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct, and
thereby acquired its monopoly power in the relevant markets unlawfully.
To answer that question, we adhere to two antitrust principles that guided
us in Microsoft. First, “to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act
must have ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the
competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one
or more competitors will not suffice.”
The Commission held that Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct
consisting of misrepresentations, omissions, and other practices that
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deceived JEDEC about the nature and scope of its patent interests while the
organization standardized technologies covered by those interests. Had
Rambus fully disclosed its intellectual property, “JEDEC either would have
excluded Rambus's patented technologies from the JEDEC DRAM
standards, or would have demanded RAND assurances, with an opportunity
for ex ante licensing negotiations.” But the Commission did not determine
that one or the other of these two possible outcomes was the more likely.
The Commission's conclusion that Rambus's conduct was exclusionary
depends, therefore, on a syllogism: Rambus avoided one of two outcomes
by not disclosing its patent interests; the avoidance of either of those
outcomes was anticompetitive; therefore Rambus's nondisclosure was
anticompetitive.
We assume without deciding that avoidance of the first of these possible
outcomes was indeed anticompetitive; that is, that if Rambus's more
complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to adopt a different (open,
non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to disclose harmed competition
and would support a monopolization claim. But while we can assume that
Rambus's nondisclosure made the adoption of its technologies somewhat
more likely than broad disclosure would have, the Commission made clear
in its remedial opinion that there was insufficient evidence
that JEDEC would have standardized other technologies had it known the
full scope of Rambus's intellectual property. See Remedy Op. 12. Therefore,
for the Commission's syllogism to survive-and for the Commission to have
carried its burden of proving that Rambus's conduct had an anticompetitive
effect-we must also be convinced that if Rambus's conduct merely enabled
it to avoid the other possible outcome, namely JEDEC's obtaining
assurances from Rambus of RAND licensing terms, such conduct, alone,
could be said to harm competition.
Deceptive conduct-like any other kind-must have an anticompetitive
effect in order to form the basis of a monopolization claim. “Even an act of
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without
more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws,” without proof of “a
dangerous probability that [the defendant] would monopolize a particular
market.” Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225. Even if deception raises the price
secured by a seller, but does so without harming competition, it is beyond
the antitrust laws' reach. Cases that recognize deception as exclusionary
hinge, therefore, on whether the conduct impaired rivals in a manner
tending to bring about or protect a defendant's monopoly power.
In Microsoft, for example, we found Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive
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conduct when it tricked independent software developers into believing that
its software development tools could be used to design cross-platform Java
applications when, in fact, they produced Windows-specific ones. The
deceit had caused “developers who were opting for portability over
performance ... unwittingly [to write] Java applications that [ran] only on
Windows.” 253 F.3d at 76. The focus of our antitrust scrutiny, therefore,
was properly placed on the resulting harms to competition rather than the
deception itself….
But an otherwise lawful monopolist's use of deception simply to obtain
higher prices normally has no particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus
to diminish competition. Consider, for example, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998), in which the Court addressed
the antitrust implications of allegations that NYNEX's subsidiary, New
York Telephone Company, a lawful monopoly provider of local telephone
services, charged its customers higher prices as result of fraudulent conduct
in the market for the service of removing outdated telephone switching
equipment (called “removal services”). Discon had alleged that New York
Telephone (through its corporate affiliate, Materiel Enterprises) switched its
purchases of removal services from Discon to a higher-priced independent
firm (AT & T Technologies). Materiel Enterprises would pass the higher
fees on to New York Telephone, which in turn passed them on to customers
through higher rates approved by regulators. The nub of the deception,
Discon alleged, was that AT & T Technologies would provide Materiel
Enterprises with a special rebate at year's end, which it would then share
with NYNEX. Id. By thus hoodwinking the regulators, the scam raised
prices for consumers; Discon, which refused to play the rebate game, was
driven out of business. Discon alleged that this arrangement was
anticompetitive and constituted both an agreement in restraint of trade in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and a conspiracy to monopolize the
market for removal services in violation of § 2.
As to Discon's § 1 claim, the Court held that where a single buyer favors
one supplier over another for an improper reason, the plaintiff must “allege
and prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to the competitive
process.” Id. at 135; see generally id. at 133-37. Nor, as Justice Breyer
wrote for a unanimous Court, would harm to the consumers in the form of
higher prices change the matter: “We concede Discon's claim that the
[defendants'] behavior hurt consumers by raising telephone service rates.
But that consumer injury naturally flowed not so much from a less
competitive market for removal services, as from the exercise of market
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power that is lawfully in the hands of a monopolist, namely, New York
Telephone, combined with a deception worked upon the regulatory agency
that prevented the agency from controlling New York Telephone's exercise
of its monopoly power.” Id. at 136.
Because Discon based its § 2 claim on the very same allegations of fraud,
the Court vacated the appellate court's decision to uphold that claim because
“[u]nless those agreements harmed the competitive process, they did not
amount to a conspiracy to monopolize.” ….
While the Commission's brief doesn't mention NYNEX, much less try to
distinguish it, it does cite Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,501 F.3d 297
(3d Cir. 2007), which in turn had cited the Commission's own “landmark”
decision in the case under review here, Id. at 311.There the court held that a
patent holder's intentionally false promise to a standard-setting organization
that it would license its technology on RAND terms, “coupled with [the
organization's] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a
standard,” was anticompetitive conduct, on the ground that it increased “the
likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent
holder.” Id. at 314; accord id. at 315-16. To the extent that the ruling (which
simply reversed a grant of dismissal) rested on the argument that deceit
lured the SSO away from non-proprietary technology, see id., it cannot help
the Commission in view of its inability to find that Rambus's behavior
caused JEDEC's choice; to the extent that it may have rested on a
supposition that there is a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act when a
lawful monopolist's deceit has the effect of raising prices (without an effect
on competitive structure), it conflicts with NYNEX.
Here, the Commission expressly left open the likelihood
that JEDEC would have standardized Rambus's technologies even if
Rambus had disclosed its intellectual property. Under this
hypothesis, JEDEC lost only an opportunity to secure a RAND commitment
from Rambus. But loss of such a commitment is not a harm to competition
from alternative technologies in the relevant markets. See 2 Hovenkamp et
al., IP & Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-45 (Supp. 2008) [hereinafter “IP
& Antitrust”] (“[A]n antitrust plaintiff must establish that the standardsetting organization would not have adopted the standard in question but for
the misrepresentation or omission.”). Indeed, had JEDEC limited Rambus
to reasonable royalties and required it to provide licenses on a
nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less competition from alternative
technologies, not more; high prices and constrained output tend to attract
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competitors, not to repel them.
Scholars in the field have urged that if nondisclosure to an SSO enables a
participant to obtain higher royalties than would otherwise have been
attainable, the “overcharge can properly constitute competitive harm
attributable to the nondisclosure,” as the overcharge “will distort
competition in the downstream market.” 2 Hovenkamp, et al., IP
& Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-47. The contention that price-raising deception has
downstream effects is surely correct, but that consequence was equally
surely true in NYNEX (though perhaps on a smaller scale) and equally
obvious to the Court. The Commission makes the related contention that
because the ability to profitably restrict output and set supracompetitive
prices is the sine qua non of monopoly power, any conduct that permits a
monopolist to avoid constraints on the exercise of that power must be
anticompetitive. But again, as in NYNEX, an otherwise lawful monopolist's
end-run around price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent, does
not alone present a harm to competition in the monopolized market.
Thus, if JEDEC, in the world that would have existed but for Rambus's
deception, would have standardized the very same technologies, Rambus's
alleged deception cannot be said to have had an effect on competition in
violation of the antitrust laws; JEDEC's loss of an opportunity to seek
favorable licensing terms is not as such an antitrust harm. Yet the
Commission did not reject this as being a possible-perhaps even the more
probable-effect of Rambus's conduct. We hold, therefore, that the
Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus's conduct was exclusionary,
and thus to establish its claim that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the
relevant markets.
***
Our conclusion that the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus
inflicted any harm on competition requires vacatur of the Commission's
orders. But the original complaint also included a count charging Rambus
with other unfair methods of competition in violation of § 5(a) of the FTC
Act. While the Commission dropped this aspect of its case and focused on a
theory of liability premised on unlawful monopolization, see Liability Op.
at 27 n. 124, at least one Commissioner suggested that a “stand-alone” § 5
action would have had a “broader province” than a Sherman Act case. See
Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz at 18, 21, Docket No.
9302 (Jul. 31, 2006). Because of the chance of further proceedings on
remand, we express briefly our serious concerns about strength of the
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evidence relied on to support some of the Commission's crucial findings
regarding the scope of JEDEC's patent disclosure policies and Rambus's
alleged violation of those policies.
In noting our concerns, we recognize, of course, that the Commission's
findings are conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c); see also Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at
33. The Commission's findings are murky on both the relevant margins:
what JEDEC's disclosure policies were, and what, within those mandates,
Rambus failed to disclose.
First, the Commission evidently could find that Rambus
violated JEDEC's disclosure policies only by relying quite significantly on
participants' having been obliged to disclose their work in progress
on potential amendments to pending applications, as that work became
pertinent. The Commission's counsel confirmed as much at oral argument.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38. Indeed, the parties stipulated that as
of Rambus's last JEDEC meeting it held no patents that were essential to the
manufacture or use of devices complying with any JEDEC standard, and
that when JEDEC issued the SDRAM standard Rambus had no pending
patent claims that would necessarily have been infringed by a device
compliant with that standard.
The case appears (and we emphasize appears, as the Commission's
opinion leaves us uncertain of its real view) to turn on the idea
that JEDEC participants were obliged to disclose not merely relevant
patents and patent applications, but also their work in progress on
amendments to pending applications that included new patent claims. We
do not see in the record any formal finding that the policies were so broad,
but the Commission's opinion points to testimony of witnesses that might be
the basis of such a finding. Five former JC 42.3 participants testified (in
some cases ambiguously) that they understood JEDEC's written policies,
requiring the disclosure of pending applications, to also include a duty to
disclose work in progress on unfiled amendments to those applications,
and JEDEC's general counsel testified that he believed a firm was
required to disclose plans to amend if supported by the firm's current
interpretation of an extant application. JEDEC participants did not have
unanimous recollections on this point, however, and the Commission noted
that another JC 42.3 member testified that there was no duty to disclose
work on future filings.
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Reading these statements as interpretations of JEDEC's written policies
seems to significantly stretch the policies' language. The most disclosurefriendly of those policies is JEDEC Manual No. 21-I, published in October
1993, which refers to “the obligation of all participants to inform the
meeting of any knowledge they may have of any patents, or pending
patents, that might be involved in the work they are undertaking.” CX 208
at 19; see also id. at 19 (“For the purpose of this policy, the word ‘patented’
also includes items and processes for which a patent has been applied and
may be pending.”), 27 (referring to “technical information covered by [a]
patent or pending patent”). This language speaks fairly clearly of disclosure
obligations related to patents and pending patent applications, but says
nothing of unfiled work in progress on potential amendments to patent
applications. We don't see how a few strands of trial testimony would
persuade the Commission to read this language more broadly, especially as
at least two of the five participants cited merely stated that disclosure
obligations reached anything in the patent “process”-which leaves open the
question of when that “process” can be said to begin. See Joint Appendix
1908-09 (testimony of Desi Rhoden); id. at 2038 (testimony of Brett
Williams).
Alternatively, to the extent the Commission reads this testimony not to
broaden the interpretation of Manual 21-I, but rather to provide evidence of
disclosure expectations that extended beyond those incorporated into
written policies, a different problem may arise. As the Federal Circuit has
said, JEDEC's patent disclosure policies suffered from “a staggering lack of
defining details.” Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081,
1102 (Fed.Cir.2003); see also Liability Op. at 52 (stating that the record
shows that JEDEC's patent policies “are not a model of clarity”). Even
assuming that any evidence of unwritten disclosure expectations would
survive a possible narrowing effect based upon the written directive of
Manual 21-I, the vagueness of any such expectations would nonetheless
remain an obstacle. One would expect that disclosure expectations
ostensibly requiring competitors to share information that they would
otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide “clear
guidance” and “define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the members
must disclose.” Infineon, 318 F.3d at 1102. This need for clarity seems
especially acute where disclosure of those trade secrets itself implicates
antitrust concerns; JEDEC involved,
after
all,
collaboration
by competitors. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (stating that because SSO members have incentives to
restrain competition, such organizations “have traditionally been objects
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of antitrust scrutiny”); Am Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 571 (1982) (noting that SSOs are “rife with opportunities for
anticompetitive activity”). In any event, the more vague and muddled a
particular expectation of disclosure, the more difficult it should be for the
Commission to ascribe competitive harm to its breach. See 2 IP
& Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-51 (“[A]lthough antitrust can serve as a useful
check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it cannot substitute for a
general enforcement regime for disclosure rules.”).
The Commission's conclusion that Rambus engaged in deceptive conduct
affecting the inclusion of on-chip PLL/DLL and dual-edge clocking in the
DDR SDRAM standard, which JEDEC adopted more than two years after
Rambus's last JC 42.3 meeting, presents an additional, independent concern.
To support this conclusion, the Commission looked to a technical
presentation made to JC 42.3 in September 1994, and the survey balloting
of that committee in October 1995 on whether to proceed with the
consideration of particular features (including the two Rambus technologies
ultimately adopted), finding that Rambus deliberately failed to disclose
patent interests in any of the named technologies. Liability Op. 42-44. This
finding is evidently the basis, so far as DDR SDRAM is concerned, of its
conclusion that Rambus breached a duty to disclose.
Once again, the Commission has taken an aggressive interpretation of
rather weak evidence. For example, the October 1995 survey ballot gauged
participant interest in a range of technologies and did not ask those
surveyed about their intellectual property (as did the more formal ballots on
proposed standards). See CX 260. The Commission nonetheless believes
that every member of JC 42.3-membership that included most of the
DRAM industry-was duty-bound to disclose any potential patents they were
working on that related to any of the questions posed by the survey. The
record shows, however, that the only company that made a disclosure at the
next meeting was the one that formally presented the survey results. See
Liability Op. at 44-45; ALJ Op. at 58 ¶ 401 (citing Joint Exhibit 28, at 6).
For reasons similar to those that make vague but broad disclosure
obligations among competitors unlikely, it seems to us unlikely that
JEDEC participants placed themselves under such a sweeping and early
duty to disclose, triggered by the mere chance that a technology might
someday (in this case, more than two years later) be formally proposed for
standardization.
***
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We set aside the Commission's orders and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Other aspects of the standard setting process are covered in Chapter
Nine.
2. Spoliation and the Duty to Preserve. As noted earlier, Rambus did not
initially file its patent application with claims explicitly directed at
SDRAM, however, after Rambus decide to leave JEDEC, it amended its
claims to cover the SDRAM technology adopted as the standard by JEDEC.
As one may be able to assume, the patents stemming from the original
application and its amendments have been the subjects of numerous suits.
Recently, the Federal Circuit issued opinions addressing Rambus’s alleged
spoliation of relevant evidence for patents claiming priority to the
07/510,898 application. Prior the Federal Circuits decision, the District of
Delaware and the Northern District of Califorina courts issued two
inconsistent opinions regarding Rambus’s duty to preserve evidence. See
Micoron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
and Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.2d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
The facts of both cases uncovered that Rambus established a
document retention policy as an integral part its litigation strategy against
probable infringers of its patents in April of 1998. Micron, 645 F.3d at
1316-18. Additionally, throughout the year, Rambus destroyed email
backup tapes and in September it held its first “Shed Day,” destroying 400
boxes of documents. Id. at 18. In June 1999, the first patent suit was filed.
In Micron, a Delaware court had held that Rambus committed
intentional spoliation and declared several of its patents unenforceable.
Micron, 645 F.3d at 1322. In Hynix, a California court concluded that
Rambus destroyed documents before the duty to preserve, thus no spoliation
had occurred. Hynix, 645 F.3d at 1347.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Delaware’s court’s spoliation findings,
while reversing and remanding for a remedy. But the court reversed the
California court’s decision, remanding for reconsideration of the spoliation
issue. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit declared that whether litigation is
reasonably foreseeable and thus triggers a duty to preserve is an “objective
standard, asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation,
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but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would
have reasonably foreseen litigation.” Micron, 645 F.3d at 1320-21. The
Federal Circuit then went on to explain that the reasonably foreseeable test
is “a flexible fact-specific standard,” and does not trigger the duty to
preserve when litigation is merely possible or “from the mere existence of a
potential claim.” Additionally, the court rejected the standard that litigation
be “imminent, or probable without significant contingencies.” Hynix, 645
F.3d at 1345.
The Federal Circuit made clear that there is a duty to preserve relevant
evidence but what exactly does “relevant” entail? Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery as “any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons who know of any discoverable matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has held that “relevance” under Rule
26(b)(1) “is construed more broadly for discovery that for trial[,]” and that
in most instances, the trial court should err on side of permitting discovery.
Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, 813 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
Considering the definitions provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Circuit, what impact do you think a Walker
Process or sham litigation claim will have on discovery?

PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND "PAY
FOR DELAY"
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. ACTAVIS, INC.
133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013)
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
ALITO, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed
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infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent's term expires,
and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.
Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer,
rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often
called a “reverse payment” settlement agreement. And the basic question
here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish
competition in violation of the antitrust laws....
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment
settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit
stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is “immune
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” And since the alleged
infringer's promise not to enter the patentee's market expired before the
patent's term ended, the Circuit found the agreement legal and dismissed the
FTC complaint. In our view, however, reverse payment settlements such as
the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the
antitrust laws. We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have
allowed the FTC's lawsuit to proceed.
I
A
Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements
arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and specifically in
the context of suits brought under statutory provisions allowing a generic
drug manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to challenge the
validity of a patent owned by an already-approved brand-name drug owner.
See Brief for Petitioner 29; 12 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶
2046, p. 338 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter Areeda); Hovenkamp, Sensible
Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F.L.Rev. 11, 24
(2004). We consequently describe four key features of the relevant drugregulatory framework established by the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, as amended. That Act is
commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act.
First, a drug manufacturer, wishing to market a new prescription
drug, must submit a New Drug Application to the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and undergo a long, comprehensive, and costly
testing process, after which, if successful, the manufacturer will receive
marketing approval from the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (requiring,
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among other things, “full reports of investigations” into safety and
effectiveness; “a full list of the articles used as components”; and a “full
description” of how the drug is manufactured, processed, and packed).
Second, once the FDA has approved a brand-name drug for
marketing, a manufacturer of a generic drug can obtain similar marketing
approval through use of abbreviated procedures. The Hatch–Waxman Act
permits a generic manufacturer to file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application specifying that the generic has the “same active ingredients as,”
and is “biologically equivalent” to, the already-approved brand-name
drug.... In this way the generic manufacturer can obtain approval while
avoiding the “costly and time-consuming studies” needed to obtain approval
“for a pioneer drug.”... The Hatch–Waxman process, by allowing the
generic to piggy-back on the pioneer's approval efforts, “speed[s] the
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market,” thereby furthering drug
competition.
Third, the Hatch–Waxman Act sets forth special procedures for
identifying, and resolving, related patent disputes. It requires the pioneer
brand-name manufacturer to list in its New Drug Application the “number
and the expiration date” of any relevant patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
And it requires the generic manufacturer in its Abbreviated New Drug
Application to “assure the FDA” that the generic “will not infringe” the
brand-name's patents....
[The generic] can certify that any relevant patents have expired. It
can request approval to market beginning when any still-in-force patents
expire. Or, it can certify that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the drug described in
the Abbreviated New Drug Application. Taking this last-mentioned route
(called the “paragraph IV” route), automatically counts as patent
infringement... and often “means provoking litigation.”.... If the brandname patentee brings an infringement suit within 45 days, the FDA then
must withhold approving the generic, usually for a 30–month period, while
the parties litigate patent validity (or infringement) in court. If the courts
decide the matter within that period, the FDA follows that determination; if
they do not, the FDA may go forward and give approval to market the
generic product. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Fourth, Hatch–Waxman provides a special incentive for a generic to
be the first to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application taking the
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paragraph IV route. That applicant will enjoy a period of 180 days of
exclusivity (from the first commercial marketing of its drug). See §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (establishing exclusivity period). During that period of
exclusivity no other generic can compete with the brand-name drug. If the
first-to-file generic manufacturer can overcome any patent obstacle and
bring the generic to market, this 180–day period of exclusivity can prove
valuable, possibly “worth several hundred million dollars.” Hemphill,
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006).... The 180–day exclusivity
period, however, can belong only to the first generic to file. Should that
first-to-file generic forfeit the exclusivity right in one of the ways specified
by statute, no other generic can obtain it. See § 355(j)(5)(D).
B
1
In 1999, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, a respondent here, filed a New
Drug Application for a brand-name drug called AndroGel. The FDA
approved the application in 2000. In 2003, Solvay obtained a relevant patent
and disclosed that fact to the FDA, 677 F.3d, at 1308, as Hatch–Waxman
requires....
Later the same year another respondent, Actavis, Inc. (then known
as Watson Pharmaceuticals), filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application
for a generic drug modeled after AndroGel. Subsequently, Paddock
Laboratories, also a respondent, separately filed an Abbreviated New Drug
Application for its own generic product. Both Actavis and Paddock certified
under paragraph IV that Solvay's listed patent was invalid and their drugs
did not infringe it. A fourth manufacturer, Par Pharmaceutical, likewise a
respondent, did not file an application of its own but joined forces with
Paddock, agreeing to share the patent litigation costs in return for a share of
profits if Paddock obtained approval for its generic drug.
Solvay initiated paragraph IV patent litigation against Actavis and
Paddock. Thirty months later the FDA approved Actavis' first-to-file
generic product, but, in 2006, the patent-litigation parties all settled. Under
the terms of the settlement Actavis agreed that it would not bring its generic
to market until August 31, 2015, 65 months before Solvay's patent expired
(unless someone else marketed a generic sooner). Actavis also agreed to
promote AndroGel to urologists. The other generic manufacturers made
roughly similar promises. And Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to
each generic—$12 million in total to Paddock; $60 million in total to Par;
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and an estimated $19–$30 million annually, for nine years, to Actavis. See
App. 46, 49–50, Complaint ¶¶ 66, 77. The companies described these
payments as compensation for other services the generics promised to
perform, but the FTC contends the other services had little value. According
to the FTC the true point of the payments was to compensate the generics
for agreeing not to compete against AndroGel until 2015. See id., at 50–53,
Complaint ¶¶ 81–85.
2
On January 29, 2009, the FTC filed this lawsuit against all the settling
parties, namely, Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and Par. The FTC's complaint
(as since amended) alleged that respondents violated § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by unlawfully agreeing “to share in
Solvay's monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain
from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with AndroGel
for nine years.” .. The District Court held that these allegations did not set
forth an antitrust law violation....
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court. It wrote that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,
a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent.” 677 F.3d, at 1312. The court recognized that “antitrust laws
typically prohibit agreements where one company pays a potential
competitor not to enter the market.” See also Palmer, 498 U.S., at 50
(agreement to divide territorial markets held “unlawful on its face”). But,
the court found that “reverse payment settlements of patent litigation
presen[t] atypical cases because one of the parties owns a patent.”... Patent
holders have a “lawful right to exclude others from the market”; thus a
patent “conveys the right to cripple competition.” The court recognized
that, if the parties to this sort of case do not settle, a court might declare the
patent invalid. But, in light of the public policy favoring settlement of
disputes (among other considerations) it held that the courts could not
require the parties to continue to litigate in order to avoid antitrust liability.
The FTC sought certiorari. Because different courts have reached
different conclusions about the application of the antitrust laws to Hatch–
Waxman–related patent settlements, we granted the FTC's petition.
Compare, e.g., id., at 1312 (case below) (settlements generally “immune
from antitrust attack”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–1337 (C.A.Fed.2008) (similar); In re
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Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212–213 (C.A.2
2006) (similar), with In re K–Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214–
218 (C.A.3 2012) (settlements presumptively unlawful).
II
A
Solvay's patent, if valid and infringed, might have permitted it to
charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the reverse settlement payments it
agreed to make to its potential generic competitors. And we are willing to
take this fact as evidence that the agreement's “anticompetitive effects fall
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” But we do not
agree that that fact, or characterization, can immunize the agreement from
antitrust attack.
For one thing, to refer, as the Circuit referred, simply to what the
holder of a valid patent could do does not by itself answer the antitrust
question. The patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not be
infringed. “[A] valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the
protected process or product,” United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 308 (1948). And that exclusion may permit the patent owner to charge
a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product. But an invalidated
patent carries with it no such right. And even a valid patent confers no right
to exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe. The
paragraph IV litigation in this case put the patent's validity at issue, as well
as its actual preclusive scope. The parties' settlement ended that litigation.
The FTC alleges that in substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants
many millions of dollars to stay out of its market, even though the
defendants did not have any claim that the plaintiff was liable to them for
damages. That form of settlement is unusual. And, for reasons discussed in
Part II–B, infra, there is reason for concern that settlements taking this form
tend to have significant adverse effects on competition.
Given these factors, it would be incongruous to determine antitrust
legality by measuring the settlement's anticompetitive effects solely against
patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive
antitrust policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the Circuit's view that the
only pertinent question is whether “the settlement agreement ... fall[s]
within” the legitimate “scope” of the patent's “exclusionary potential,” this
Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in
determining the “scope of the patent monopoly”—and consequently
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antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.
Thus, the Court in Line Material explained that “the improper use of
[a patent] monopoly,” is “invalid” under the antitrust laws and resolved the
antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation “between the
lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint
prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.” To strike that balance, the Court
asked questions such as whether “the patent statute specifically gives a
right” to restrain competition in the manner challenged; and whether
“competition is impeded to a greater degree” by the restraint at issue than
other restraints previously approved as reasonable. See also United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–391 (1948) (courts must
“balance the privileges of [the patent holder] and its licensees under the
patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against combinations
and attempts to monopolize”).... In short, rather than measure the length or
amount of a restriction solely against the length of the patent's term or its
earning potential, as the Court of Appeals apparently did here, this Court
answered the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust factors
such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and
potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, such
as here those related to patents. See Part II–B, infIra. Whether a particular
restraint lies “beyond the limits of the patent monopoly” is a conclusion that
flows from that analysis and not, as the Chief Justice suggests, its starting
point. Post, at 2239, 2241 – 2242 (dissenting opinion).
For another thing, this Court's precedents make clear that patentrelated settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws. In
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), for example, two
sewing machine companies possessed competing patent claims; a third
company sought a patent under circumstances where doing so might lead to
the disclosure of information that would invalidate the other two firms'
patents. All three firms settled their patent-related disagreements while
assigning the broadest claims to the firm best able to enforce the patent
against yet other potential competitors. The Court did not examine whether,
on the assumption that all three patents were valid, patent law would have
allowed the patents' holders to do the same. Rather, emphasizing that the
Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities in which
patent owners may lawfully engage,” it held that the agreements, although
settling patent disputes, violated the antitrust laws. And that, in important
part, was because “the public interest in granting patent monopolies” exists
only to the extent that “the public is given a novel and useful invention” in
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“consideration for its grant.” Id., at 199 (White, J., concurring). See also
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952) (applying
antitrust scrutiny to patent settlement); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (same).
Similarly, both within the settlement context and without, the Court
has struck down overly restrictive patent licensing agreements—irrespective
of whether those agreements produced supra-patent-permitted revenues. We
concede that in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489
(1926), the Court permitted a single patentee to grant to a single licensee a
license containing a minimum resale price requirement. But in Line
Material, supra, the Court held that the antitrust laws forbid a group of
patentees, each owning one or more patents, to cross-license each other,
and, in doing so, to insist that each licensee maintain retail prices set
collectively by the patent holders. The Court was willing to presume that
the single-patentee practice approved in General Electric was a “reasonable
restraint” that “accords with the patent monopoly granted by the patent
law,” but declined to extend that conclusion to multiple-patentee
agreements: “As the Sherman Act prohibits agreements to fix prices, any
arrangement between patentees runs afoul of that prohibition and is outside
the patent monopoly.” In New Wrinkle, 342 U.S., at 378, the Court held
roughly the same, this time in respect to a similar arrangement in settlement
of a litigation between two patentees, each of which contended that its own
patent gave it the exclusive right to control production. That one or the
other company (we may presume) was right about its patent did not lead the
Court to confer antitrust immunity. Far from it, the agreement was found to
violate the Sherman Act.
Finally in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), the Court upheld crosslicensing agreements among patentees that settled actual and impending
patent litigation, 283 U.S., at 168, which agreements set royalty rates to be
charged third parties for a license to practice all the patents at issue (and
which divided resulting revenues). But, in doing so, Justice Brandeis,
writing for the Court, warned that such an arrangement would have violated
the Sherman Act had the patent holders thereby “dominate[d]” the industry
and “curtail[ed] the manufacture and supply of an unpatented product.”
These cases do not simply ask whether a hypothetically valid patent's holder
would be able to charge, e.g., the high prices that the challenged patentrelated term allowed. Rather, they seek to accommodate patent and antitrust
policies, finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent
law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition.

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 78
August 2013

Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, there is nothing novel
about our approach. What does appear novel are the dissent's suggestions
that a patent holder may simply “pa[y] a competitor to respect its patent”
and quit its patent invalidity or noninfringement claim without any antitrust
scrutiny whatever, and that “such settlements ... are a well-known feature of
intellectual property litigation.” Closer examination casts doubt on these
claims. The dissent does not identify any patent statute that it understands to
grant such a right to a patentee, whether expressly or by fair implication. It
would be difficult to reconcile the proposed right with the patent-related
policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will not
“continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without
need or justification.” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
And the authorities cited for this proposition (none from this Court,
and none an antitrust case) are not on point. Some of them say that when
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement and demands, say,
$100 million in damages, it is not uncommon for B (the defendant) to pay A
(the plaintiff) some amount less than the full demand as part of the
settlement—$40 million, for example. See Schildkraut, Patent–Splitting
Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1046
(2004) (suggesting that this hypothetical settlement includes “an implicit net
payment” from A to B of $60 million— i.e., the amount of the settlement
discount). The cited authorities also indicate that if B has a counterclaim for
damages against A, the original infringement plaintiff, A might end up
paying B to settle B's counterclaim. Cf. Metro–Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007
Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 13 (C.A.1 1999) (describing trademark
dispute and settlement). Insofar as the dissent urges that settlements taking
these commonplace forms have not been thought for that reason alone
subject to antitrust liability, we agree, and do not intend to alter that
understanding. But the dissent appears also to suggest that reverse payment
settlements— e.g., in which A, the plaintiff, pays money to defendant B
purely so B will give up the patent fight—should be viewed for antitrust
purposes in the same light as these familiar settlement forms. See post, at
2231 – 2232. We cannot agree. In the traditional examples cited above, a
party with a claim (or counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or
less than the value of its claim. In reverse payment settlements, in contrast,
a party with no claim for damages (something that is usually true of a
paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money simply so it will
stay away from the patentee's market. That, we think, is something quite
different. Cf. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
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Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“[C]ollusion” is “the supreme evil
of antitrust”).
Finally, the Hatch–Waxman Act itself does not embody a statutory
policy that supports the Eleventh Circuit's view. Rather, the general
procompetitive thrust of the statute, its specific provisions facilitating
challenges to a patent's validity, see Part I–A, supra, and its later-added
provisions requiring parties to a patent dispute triggered by a paragraph IV
filing to report settlement terms to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, all suggest the contrary. Those interested in
legislative history may also wish to examine the statements of individual
Members of Congress condemning reverse payment settlements in advance
of the 2003 amendments. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 14437 (2002) (remarks
of Sen. Hatch) (“It was and is very clear that the [Hatch–Waxman Act] was
not designed to allow deals between brand and generic companies to delay
competition”); 146 Cong. Rec. 18774 (2000) (remarks of Rep. Waxman)
(introducing bill to deter companies from “strik[ing] collusive agreements
to trade multimillion dollar payoffs by the brand company for delays in the
introduction of lower cost, generic alternatives”).
B
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion finds some degree of support in a
general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes. ... The Circuit's
related underlying practical concern consists of its fear that antitrust
scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to litigate
the validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened
to competition in the absence of the settlement. Any such litigation will
prove time consuming, complex, and expensive. The antitrust game, the
Circuit may believe, would not be worth that litigation candle.
We recognize the value of settlements and the patent litigation
problem. But we nonetheless conclude that this patent-related factor should
not determine the result here. Rather, five sets of considerations lead us to
conclude that the FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its
antitrust claim.
First, the specific restraint at issue has the “potential for genuine
adverse effects on competition.” Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S., at
460–461 (citing 7 Areeda ¶ 1511, at 429 (1986)). The payment in effect
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its
product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were
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to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic
product. Suppose, for example, that the exclusive right to sell produces $50
million in supracompetitive profits per year for the patentee. And suppose
further that the patent has 10 more years to run. Continued litigation, if it
results in patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement, could cost the
patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would flow in large
part to consumers in the form of lower prices.
We concede that settlement on terms permitting the patent
challenger to enter the market before the patent expires would also bring
about competition, again to the consumer's benefit. But settlement on the
terms said by the FTC to be at issue here—payment in return for staying out
of the market—simply keeps prices at patentee-set levels, potentially
producing the full patent-related $500 million monopoly return while
dividing that return between the challenged patentee and the patent
challenger. The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.
Indeed, there are indications that patentees sometimes pay a generic
challenger a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in profits if
it won the paragraph IV litigation and entered the market. See Hemphill, 81
N.Y.U. L.Rev., at 1581. See also Brief for 118 Law, Economics, and
Business Professors et al. as Amici Curiae 25 (estimating that this is true of
the settlement challenged here). The rationale behind a payment of this size
cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement considerations.
The payment may instead provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to
induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its
monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market.
But, one might ask, as a practical matter would the parties be able to
enter into such an anticompetitive agreement? Would not a high reverse
payment signal to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional challenges, perhaps
too many for the patentee to “buy off?” Two special features of Hatch–
Waxman mean that the answer to this question is “not necessarily so.” First,
under Hatch–Waxman only the first challenger gains the special advantage
of 180 days of an exclusive right to sell a generic version of the brand-name
product. See Part I–A, supra. And as noted, that right has proved valuable—
indeed, it can be worth several hundred million dollars. See Hemphill,
supra, at 1579; Brief for Petitioner 6. Subsequent challengers cannot secure
that exclusivity period, and thus stand to win significantly less than the first
if they bring a successful paragraph IV challenge. That is, if subsequent
litigation results in invalidation of the patent, or a ruling that the patent is
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not infringed, that litigation victory will free not just the challenger to
compete, but all other potential competitors too (once they obtain FDA
approval). The potential reward available to a subsequent challenger being
significantly less, the patentee's payment to the initial challenger (in return
for not pressing the patent challenge) will not necessarily provoke
subsequent challenges. Second, a generic that files a paragraph IV after
learning that the first filer has settled will (if sued by the brand-name) have
to wait out a stay period of (roughly) 30 months before the FDA may
approve its application, just as the first filer did. See 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii). These features together mean that a reverse payment
settlement with the first filer (or, as in this case, all of the initial filers)
“removes from consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one
closest to introducing competition.” Hemphill, supra, at 1586. The dissent
may doubt these provisions matter, post, at 2234 – 2236, but scholars in the
field tell us that “where only one party owns a patent, it is virtually unheard
of outside of pharmaceuticals for that party to pay an accused infringer to
settle the lawsuit.” 1 H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M. Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP
and Antitrust § 15.3, p. 15–45, n. 161 (2d ed. Supp. 2011). It may well be
that Hatch–Waxman's unique regulatory framework, including the special
advantage that the 180–day exclusivity period gives to first filers, does
much to explain why in this context, but not others, the patentee's ordinary
incentives to resist paying off challengers ( i.e., the fear of provoking
myriad other challengers) appear to be more frequently overcome. See 12
Areeda ¶ 2046, at 341 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that these provisions, no doubt
unintentionally, have created special incentives for collusion).
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes
prove unjustified. See 7 id., ¶ 1504, at 410–415 (3d ed. 2010); California
Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 786–787 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). As the FTC admits, offsetting or redeeming
virtues are sometimes present. Brief for Petitioner 37–39. The reverse
payment, for example, may amount to no more than a rough approximation
of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement. That payment may
reflect compensation for other services that the generic has promised to
perform—such as distributing the patented item or helping to develop a
market for that item. There may be other justifications. Where a reverse
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided
litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a
patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation
or a finding of noninfringement. In such cases, the parties may have
provided for a reverse payment without having sought or brought about the
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anticompetitive consequences we mentioned above. But that possibility
does not justify dismissing the FTC's complaint. An antitrust defendant may
show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are present,
thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing the
lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Indiana
Federation of Dentists, supra, at 459; 7 Areeda ¶¶ 1504a–1504b, at 401–404
(3d ed. 2010).
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that
harm about in practice. See id., ¶ 1503, at 392–393. At least, the “size of the
payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself
a strong indicator of power”—namely, the power to charge prices higher
than the competitive level. 12 id., ¶ 2046, at 351. An important patent itself
helps to assure such power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to
pay “large sums” to induce “others to stay out of its market.” Ibid. In any
event, the Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse payment
agreements are associated with the presence of higher-than-competitive
profits—a strong indication of market power.
Fourth, an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed. The Circuit's holding
does avoid the need to litigate the patent's validity (and also, any question of
infringement). But to do so, it throws the baby out with the bath water, and
there is no need to take that drastic step. That is because it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question (unless,
perhaps, to determine whether the patent litigation is a sham, see 677 F.3d,
at 1312). An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent's survival. And
that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment's objective is to maintain
supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger
rather than face what might have been a competitive market—the very
anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust
unlawfulness. The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be
that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to
prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a word, the size of the
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent's weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed
exploration of the validity of the patent itself. 12 Areeda ¶ 2046, at 350–
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352.
Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust
liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit. They
may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for example, by allowing
the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to
that point. Although the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements that
include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What are those
reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patentgenerated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other justification,
the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring
with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or individual
may well possess market power derived from the patent; a court, by
examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess its likely
anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without
litigating the validity of the patent; and parties may well find ways to settle
patent disputes without the use of reverse payments. In our view, these
considerations, taken together, outweigh the single strong consideration—
the desirability of settlements—that led the Eleventh Circuit to provide
near-automatic antitrust immunity to reverse payment settlements.
III
The FTC urges us to hold that reverse payment settlement
agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts reviewing such
agreements should proceed via a “quick look” approach, rather than
applying a “rule of reason.” See California Dental, 526 U.S., at 775, n. 12
(“Quick-look analysis in effect” shifts to “a defendant the burden to show
empirical evidence of procompetitive effects”); 7 Areeda ¶ 1508, at 435–
440 (3d ed. 2010). We decline to do so. In California Dental, we held
(unanimously) that abandonment of the “rule of reason” in favor of
presumptive rules (or a “quick-look” approach) is appropriate only where
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets.” 526 U.S., at 770 (BREYER, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We do not believe that reverse
payment settlements, in the context we here discuss, meet this criterion.

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 84
August 2013

That is because the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the
payor's anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other
convincing justification. The existence and degree of any anticompetitive
consequence may also vary as among industries. These complexities lead us
to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason
cases.
To say this is not to require the courts to insist, contrary to what we
have said, that the Commission need litigate the patent's validity,
empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system, present
every possible supporting fact or refute every possible pro-defense theory.
As a leading antitrust scholar has pointed out, “ ‘[t]here is always something
of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness,’” and as such “ ‘the quality
of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’ ” California Dental,
supra, at 780 (quoting with approval 7 Areeda ¶ 1507, at 402 (1986)).
As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust litigation
so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated
to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible
fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive
consequences. See 7 id., ¶ 1508c, at 438–440. We therefore leave to the
lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.
We reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. And we remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice SCALIA and Justice
THOMAS join, dissenting.
Solvay Pharmaceuticals holds a patent. It sued two generic drug
manufacturers that it alleged were infringing that patent. Those companies
counterclaimed, contending the patent was invalid and that, in any event,
their products did not infringe. The parties litigated for three years before
settling on these terms: Solvay agreed to pay the generics millions of dollars
and to allow them into the market five years before the patent was set to
expire; in exchange, the generics agreed to provide certain services (help
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with marketing and manufacturing) and to honor Solvay's patent. The
Federal Trade Commission alleges that such a settlement violates the
antitrust laws. The question is how to assess that claim.
A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of antitrust
laws. The correct approach should therefore be to ask whether the
settlement gives Solvay monopoly power beyond what the patent already
gave it. The Court, however, departs from this approach, and would instead
use antitrust law's amorphous rule of reason to inquire into the
anticompetitive effects of such settlements. This novel approach is without
support in any statute, and will discourage the settlement of patent
litigation. I respectfully dissent.
I
The point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to
promote consumer welfare. The point of patent law is to grant limited
monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a patent grants “the
right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.” Dawson
Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). In doing so it
provides an exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent— i.e., the
rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which the patent
holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.
This should go without saying, in part because we've said it so many
times. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (“ ‘A patent ... is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies' ”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
300 (1948) (“[T]he precise terms of the grant define the limits of a
patentee's monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from
competition”); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926)
(“It is only when ... [the patentee] steps out of the scope of his patent rights”
that he comes within the operation of the Sherman Act); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (similar). Thus, although it is per se
unlawful to fix prices under antitrust law, we have long recognized that a
patent holder is entitled to license a competitor to sell its product on the
condition that the competitor charge a certain, fixed price. See, e.g., General
Elec. Co.
We have never held that it violates antitrust law for a competitor to
refrain from challenging a patent. And by extension, we have long
recognized that the settlement of patent litigation does not by itself violate
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the antitrust laws. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163
(1931) (“Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened
interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation, is not
precluded by the [Sherman] Act”). Like most litigation, patent litigation is
settled all the time, and such settlements—which can include agreements
that clearly violate antitrust law, such as licenses that fix prices, or
agreements among competitors to divide territory—do not ordinarily
subject the litigants to antitrust liability. See 1 H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M.
Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP and Antitrust § 7.3, pp. 7–13 to 7–15 (2d ed. 2003).
The key, of course, is that the patent holder—when doing anything,
including settling—must act within the scope of the patent. If its actions go
beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the patent, we have held that
such actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–197 (1963). If its actions are within the
scope of the patent, they are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, with two
exceptions concededly not applicable here: (1) when the parties settle sham
litigation, cf. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993); and (2) when the litigation
involves a patent obtained through fraud on the Patent and Trademark
Office. Walker Process Equipment, supra, at 177.
Thus, under our precedent, this is a fairly straight-forward case.
Solvay paid a competitor to respect its patent—conduct which did not
exceed the scope of its patent. No one alleges that there was sham litigation,
or that Solvay's patent was obtained through fraud on the PTO. As in any
settlement, Solvay gave its competitors something of value (money) and, in
exchange, its competitors gave it something of value (dropping their legal
claims). In doing so, they put an end to litigation that had been dragging on
for three years. Ordinarily, we would think this a good thing.
II
Today, however, the Court announces a new rule. It is willing to accept
that Solvay's actions did not exceed the scope of its patent. But it does not
agree that this is enough to “immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”
Ibid. According to the majority, if a patent holder settles litigation by
paying an alleged infringer a “large and unjustified” payment, in exchange
for having the alleged infringer honor the patent, a court should employ the
antitrust rule of reason to determine whether the settlement violates antitrust
law.
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The Court's justifications for this holding are unpersuasive. First, the
majority explains that “the patent here may or may not be valid, and may or
may not be infringed.” Because there is “uncertainty” about whether the
patent is actually valid, the Court says that any questions regarding the
legality of the settlement should be “measur[ed]” by “procompetitive
antitrust policies,” rather than “patent law policy.” This simply states the
conclusion. The difficulty with such an approach is that a patent holder
acting within the scope of its patent has an obvious defense to any antitrust
suit: that its patent allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws. But again, that's the whole point of a patent: to
confer a limited monopoly. The problem, as the Court correctly recognizes,
is that we're not quite certain if the patent is actually valid, or if the
competitor is infringing it. But that is always the case, and is plainly a
question of patent law.
The majority, however, would assess those patent law issues according
to “antitrust policies.” According to the majority, this is what the Court did
in Line Material— i.e., it “accommodat[ed]” antitrust principles and struck
a “balance” between patent and antitrust law. But the Court in Line
Material did no such thing. Rather, it explained that it is “well settled that
the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the
patent monopoly.” It then, in the very next sentence, stated that “[b]y
aggregating patents in one control, the holder of the patents cannot escape
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.” Ibid. That second sentence follows
only if such conduct—the aggregation of multiple patents—goes “beyond
the limits of the patent monopoly,” which is precisely what the Court
concluded. See id., at 312 (“There is no suggestion in the patent statutes of
authority to combine with other patent owners to fix prices on articles
covered by the respective patents” (emphasis added)). The Court stressed,
over and over, that a patent holder does not violate the antitrust laws when it
acts within the scope of its patent. See id., at 305 (“Within the limits of the
patentee's rights under his patent, monopoly of the process or product by
him is authorized by the patent statutes”); id., at 310 (“price limitations on
patented devices beyond the limits of a patent monopoly violate the
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)).
The majority suggests that “[w]hether a particular restraint lies
‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly’ is a conclusion that flows from”
applying traditional antitrust principles. It seems to have in mind a regime
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where courts ignore the patent, and simply conduct an antitrust analysis of
the settlement without regard to the validity of the patent. But a patent
holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in any unlawful
anticompetitive behavior; it is simply exercising the monopoly rights
granted to it by the Government. Its behavior would be unlawful only if its
patent were invalid or not infringed. And the scope of the patent—i.e., what
rights are conferred by the patent—should be determined by reference to
patent law. While it is conceivable to set up a legal system where you assess
the validity of patents or questions of infringement by bringing an antitrust
suit, neither the majority nor the Government suggests that Congress has
done so.
Second, the majority contends that “this Court's precedents make
clear that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the
antitrust laws.” For this carefully worded proposition, it cites Singer
Manufacturing Co., United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371
(1952), and Standard Oil Co. (Indiana). But each of those cases stands for
the same, uncontroversial point: that when a patent holder acts outside the
scope of its patent, it is no longer protected from antitrust scrutiny by the
patent.
To begin, the majority's description of Singer is inaccurate. In
Singer, several patent holders with competing claims entered into a
settlement agreement in which they cross-licensed their patents to each
other, and did so in order to disadvantage Japanese competition. See 374
U.S., at 194–195 (finding that the agreement had “a common purpose to
suppress the Japanese machine competition in the United States”
According to the majority, the Court in Singer “did not examine whether,
on the assumption that all three patents were valid, patent law would have
allowed the patents' holders to do the same.” Rather, the majority contends,
Singer held that this agreement violated the anti-trust laws because “in
important part ... ‘the public interest in granting patent monopolies' exists
only to the extent that ‘the public is given a novel and useful invention’ in
‘consideration for its grant.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Singer, 374 U.S., at 199
(White, J., concurring)). But the majority in Singer certainly did ask
whether patent law permitted such an arrangement, concluding that it did
not. See id., at 196–197 (reiterating that it “is equally well settled that the
possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the
patent monopoly ” and holding that “those limitations have been exceeded
in this case” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
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Hovenkamp § 7.2b, at 7–8, n. 15 (citing Singer as a quintessential case in
which patent holders were subject to antitrust liability because their
settlement agreement went beyond the scope of their patents and thus
conferred monopoly power beyond what the patent lawfully authorized).
New Wrinkle is to the same effect. There, the Court explained that
because “[p]rice control through cross-licensing [is] barred as beyond the
patent monopoly,” an “arrangement ... made between patent holders to pool
their patents and fix prices on the products for themselves and their
licensees ... plainly violate[s] the Sherman Act.” 342 U.S., at 379, 380. As
the Court further explained, a patent holder may not, “ ‘acting in concert
with all members of an industry ... issue substantially identical licenses to
all members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is
completely regimented, the production of competitive unpatented products
suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and prices on unpatented
products stabilized.’ ” Id., at 379–380 (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)). The majority here, however,
ignores this discussion, and instead categorizes the case as “applying
antitrust scrutiny to [a] patent settlement.”
Again, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), the parties settled claims
regarding “competing patented processes for manufacturing an unpatented
product,” which threatened to create a monopoly over the unpatented
product. 283 U.S., at 175. The Court explained that “an exchange of
licenses for the purpose of curtailing the ... supply of an unpatented product,
is beyond the privileges conferred by the patents.”
The majority is therefore right to suggest that these “precedents
make clear that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate
the antitrust laws.” The key word is sometimes. And those some times are
spelled out in our precedents. Those cases have made very clear that patent
settlements—and for that matter, any agreements relating to patents—are
subject to antitrust scrutiny if they confer benefits beyond the scope of the
patent. This makes sense. A patent exempts its holder from the antitrust
laws only insofar as the holder operates within the scope of the patent.
When the holder steps outside the scope of the patent, he can no longer use
the patent as his defense. The majority points to no case where a patent
settlement was subject to antitrust scrutiny merely because the validity of
the patent was uncertain. Not one. It is remarkable, and surely worth
something, that in the 123 years since the Sherman Act was passed, we have
never let antitrust law cross that Rubicon.
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Next, the majority points to the “general procompetitive thrust” of
the Hatch–Waxman Act, the fact that Hatch–Waxman “facilitat[es]
challenges to a patent's validity,” and its “provisions requiring parties to
[such] patent dispute [s] ... to report settlement terms to the FTC and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.” The Hatch–Waxman Act
surely seeks to encourage competition in the drug market. And, like every
law, it accomplishes its ends through specific provisions. These provisions,
for example, allow generic manufacturers to enter the market without
undergoing a duplicative application process; they also grant a 180–day
monopoly to the first qualifying generic to commercially market a
competing product. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
So yes, the point of these provisions is to encourage competition. But it
should by now be trite—and unnecessary—to say that “no legislation
pursues its purposes at all costs” and that “it frustrates rather than
effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers
the statute's primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States,
480 U.S. 522, 525–526 (1987) ( per curiam ). It is especially disturbing
here, where the Court discerns from specific provisions a very broad
policy—a “general procompetitive thrust,” in its words—and uses that
policy to unsettle the established relationship between patent and antitrust
law. Indeed, for whatever it may be worth, Congress has repeatedly
declined to enact legislation addressing the issue the Court takes on today.
In addition, it is of no consequence that settlement terms must be
reported to the FTC and the Department of Justice. Such a requirement does
not increase the role of antitrust law in scrutinizing patent settlements.
Rather, it ensures that such terms are scrutinized consistent with existing
antitrust law. In other words, it ensures that the FTC and Antitrust Division
can review the settlements to make sure that they do not confer monopoly
power beyond the scope of the patent.
The majority suggests that “[a]pparently most if not all reverse
payment settlement agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug
regulation.” Ante, at 2227. This claim is not supported empirically by
anything the majority cites, and seems unlikely. The term “reverse payment
agreement”—coined to create the impression that such settlements are
unique—simply highlights the fact that the party suing ends up paying. But
this is no anomaly, nor is it evidence of a nefarious plot; it simply results
from the fact that the patent holder plaintiff is a defendant against an
invalidity counterclaim—not a rare situation in intellectual property
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litigation. Whatever one might call them, such settlements—paying an
alleged infringer to drop its invalidity claim—are a well-known feature of
intellectual property litigation, and reflect an intuitive way to settle such
disputes. See Metro–Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183
F.3d 10, 13 (C.A.1 1999); see also Schildkraut, Patent–Splitting Settlements
and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1033, 1046–1049
(2004); Brief for Actavis 54, n. 20 (citing examples). To the extent there are
not scores and scores of these settlements to point to, this is because such
settlements—outside the context of Hatch–Waxman—are private
agreements that for obvious reasons are generally not appealed, nor publicly
available.
The majority suggests that reverse-payment agreements are distinct
because “a party with no claim for damages ... walks away with money
simply so it will stay away from the patentee's market.” Again a distinction
without a difference. While the alleged infringer may not be suing for the
patent holder's money, it is suing for the right to use and market the
(intellectual) property, which is worth money.
Finally, the majority complains that nothing in “any patent statute”
gives patent-holders the right to settle when faced with allegations of
invalidity. But the right to settle generally accompanies the right to litigate
in the first place; no one contends that drivers in an automobile accident
may not settle their competing claims merely because no statute grants them
that authority. The majority suggests that such a right makes it harder to
“eliminat[e] unwarranted patent grants.” Ibid. That may be so, but such a
result—true of all patent settlements—is no reason to adjudicate questions
of patent law under antitrust principles. Our cases establish that antitrust
law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the
patent itself conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that
again is a question of patent law, not antitrust law.
In sum, none of the Court's reasons supports its conclusion that a
patent holder, when settling a claim that its patent is invalid, is not
immunized by the fact that it is acting within the scope of its patent. And I
fear the Court's attempt to limit its holding to the context of patent
settlements under Hatch–Waxman will not long hold.
III
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The majority's rule will discourage settlement of patent litigation.
Simply put, there would be no incentive to settle if, immediately after
settling, the parties would have to litigate the same issue—the question of
patent validity—as part of a defense against an antitrust suit. In that suit, the
alleged infringer would be in the especially awkward position of being for
the patent after being against it.
This is unfortunate because patent litigation is particularly complex,
and particularly costly. As one treatise noted, “[t]he median patent case that
goes to trial costs each side $1.5 million in legal fees” alone. Hovenkamp §
7.1c, at 7–5, n. 6. One study found that the cost of litigation in this specific
context—a generic challenging a brand name pharmaceutical patent—was
about $10 million per suit. See Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma:
Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 Colum. L.Rev. 1788, 1795, n. 41
(2011) (citing M. Goodman, G. Nachman, & L. Chen, Morgan Stanley
Equity Research, Quantifying the Impact from Authorized Generics 9
(2004)).
The Court acknowledges these problems but nonetheless offers “five
sets of considerations” that it tells us overcome these concerns: (1)
sometimes patent settlements will have “ ‘genuine adverse effects on
competition’ ”; (2) “these anticompetitive consequences will at least
sometimes prove unjustified”; (3) “where a reverse payment threatens to
work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the
power to bring that harm about in practice”; (4) “it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question” because
“[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that
the patentee has serious doubts about the patent's survival,” and using a
“payment ... to prevent the risk of competition ... constitutes the relevant
anticompetitive harm”; and (5) parties may still “settle in other ways” such
as “by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market
prior to the patent's expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to
stay out prior to that point.”
Almost all of these are unresponsive to the basic problem that
settling a patent claim cannot possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive
harm if the patent holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and
therefore permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful.
This means that in any such antitrust suit, the defendant (patent holder) will
want to use the validity of his patent as a defense—in other words, he'll
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want to say “I can do this because I have a valid patent that lets me do this.”
I therefore don't see how the majority can conclude that it won't normally be
“necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question,” unless
it means to suggest that the defendant (patent holder) cannot raise his patent
as a defense in an antitrust suit. But depriving him of such a defense—if
that's what the majority means to do—defeats the point of the patent, which
is to confer a lawful monopoly on its holder.
The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent
holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away
some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court. See ante
(“payment ... to prevent the risk of competition ... constitutes the relevant
anticompetitive harm.” This is flawed for several reasons.
First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don't
know the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the
litigation. But the same is true of any hard legal question that is yet to be
adjudicated. Just because people don't know the answer doesn't mean there
is no answer until a court declares one. Yet the majority would impose
antitrust liability based on the parties' subjective uncertainty about that legal
conclusion.
The Court does so on the assumption that offering a “large” sum is
reliable evidence that the patent holder has serious doubts about the patent.
Not true. A patent holder may be 95% sure about the validity of its patent,
but particularly risk averse or litigation averse, and willing to pay a good
deal of money to rid itself of the 5% chance of a finding of invalidity. What
is actually motivating a patent holder is apparently a question district courts
will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The task of trying to discern
whether a patent holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or other
legitimate factors like risk aversion, will be made all the more difficult by
the fact that much of the evidence about the party's motivation may be
embedded in legal advice from its attorney, which would presumably be
shielded from discovery.
Second, the majority's position leads to absurd results. Let's say in
2005, a patent holder sues a competitor for infringement and faces a
counterclaim that its patent is invalid. The patent holder determines that the
risk of losing on the question of validity is low, but after a year of litigating,
grows increasingly risk averse, tired of litigation, and concerned about the
company's image, so it pays the competitor a “large” payment in exchange
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for having the competitor honor its patent. Then let's say in 2006, a different
competitor, inspired by the first competitor's success, sues the patent holder
and seeks a similar payment. The patent holder, recognizing that this
dynamic is unsustainable, litigates this suit to conclusion, all the way to the
Supreme Court, which unanimously decides the patent was valid.
According to the majority, the first settlement would violate the antitrust
laws even though the patent was ultimately declared valid, because that first
settlement took away some chance that the patent would be invalidated in
the first go around. Under this approach, a patent holder may be found
liable under antitrust law for doing what its perfectly valid patent allowed it
to do in the first place; its sin was to settle, rather than prove the correctness
of its position by litigating until the bitter end.
Third, this logic—that taking away any chance that a patent will be
invalidated is itself an antitrust problem—cannot possibly be limited to
reverse-payment agreements, or those that are “large.” Ibid. The
Government's brief acknowledges as much, suggesting that if antitrust
scrutiny is invited for such cash payments, it may also be required for
“other consideration” and “alternative arrangements.” For example, when a
patent holder licenses its product to a licensee at a fixed monopoly price,
surely it takes away some chance that its patent will be challenged by that
licensee. According to the majority's reasoning, that's an antitrust problem
that must be analyzed under the rule of reason. But see General Elec. Co.,
272 U.S., at 488 (holding that a patent holder may license its invention at a
fixed price). Indeed, the Court's own solution—that patent holders should
negotiate to allow generics into the market sooner, rather than paying them
money—also takes away some chance that the generic would have litigated
until the patent was invalidated.
Thus, although the question posed by this case is fundamentally a
question of patent law— i.e., whether Solvay's patent was valid and
therefore permitted Solvay to pay competitors to honor the scope of its
patent—the majority declares that such questions should henceforth be
scrutinized by antitrust law's unruly rule of reason. Good luck to the district
courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the “likely
anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially
offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances.”
IV
The majority invokes “procompetitive antitrust policies” but misses
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the basic point that patent laws promote consumer interests in a different
way, by providing protection against competition. As one treatise explains:
“The purpose of the rule of reason is to determine whether, on
balance, a practice is reasonably likely to be anticompetitive or
competitively harmless—that is, whether it yields lower or higher
marketwide output. By contrast, patent policy encompasses a set of
judgments about the proper tradeoff between competition and the
incentive to innovate over the long run. Antitrust's rule of reason
was not designed for such judgments and is not adept at making
them.”
Hovenkamp § 7.3, at 7–13 (footnote omitted).
The majority recognizes that “a high reverse payment” may “signal
to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks confidence in its patent,
thereby provoking additional challenges.” It brushes this off, however,
because of two features of Hatch–Waxman that make it “ ‘not necessarily
so.’ ” First, it points out that the first challenger gets a 180–day exclusive
period to market a generic version of the brand name drug, and that
subsequent challengers cannot secure that exclusivity period—meaning
when the patent holder buys off the first challenger, it has bought off its
most motivated competitor. There are two problems with this argument.
First, according to the Food and Drug Administration, all manufacturers
who file on the first day are considered “first applicants” who share the
exclusivity period. Thus, if ten generics file an application to market a
generic drug on the first day, all will be considered “first applicants.” See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb); see also FDA, Guidance for Industry:
180–Day Exclusivity When Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the Same
Day 4 (July 2003). This is not an unusual occurrence. See Brief for Generic
Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae 23–24 (citing FTC data
indicating that some drugs “have been subject to as many as sixteen firstday” generic applications; that in 2005, the average number of first-day
applications per drug was 11; and that between 2002 and 2008, the yearly
average never dropped below three first-day applications per drug).
Second, and more fundamentally, the 180 days of exclusivity simply
provides more incentive for generic challenges. Even if a subsequent
generic would not be entitled to this additional incentive, it will have as
much or nearly as much incentive to challenge the patent as a potential
challenger would in any other context outside of Hatch–Waxman, where
there is no 180–day exclusivity period. And a patent holder who gives away
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notably large sums of money because it is, as the majority surmises,
concerned about the strength of its patent, would be putting blood in water
where sharks are always near.
The majority also points to the fact that, under Hatch–Waxman, the
FDA is enjoined from approving a generic's application to market a drug for
30 months if the brand name sues the generic for patent infringement within
45 days of that application being filed. Ante, at 2235 (citing 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). According to the majority, this provision will chill
subsequent generics from challenging the patent (because they will have to
wait 30 months before receiving FDA approval to market their drug). But
this overlooks an important feature of the law: the FDA may approve the
application before the 30 months are up “if before the expiration of [the 30
months,] the district court decides that the patent is invalid or not
infringed.” § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). And even if the FDA did not have to wait
30 months, it is far from clear that a generic would want to market a drug
prior to obtaining a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Doing so
may expose it to ruinous liability for infringement.
The irony of all this is that the majority's decision may very well
discourage generics from challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first
place. Patent litigation is costly, time consuming, and uncertain. See Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476, n. 4 (C.A.Fed.1998)
(opinion of Rader, J.) (en banc) (discussing study showing that the Federal
Circuit wholly or partially reversed in almost 40 percent of claim
construction appeals in a 30–month period); Brief for Generic
Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae 16 (citing a 2010 study
analyzing the prior decade's cases and showing that generics prevailed in 82
cases and lost in 89 cases). Generics “enter this risky terrain only after
careful analysis of the potential gains if they prevail and the potential
exposure if they lose.” Taking the prospect of settlements off the table—or
limiting settlements to an earlier entry date for the generic, which may still
be many years in the future—puts a damper on the generic's expected value
going into litigation, and decreases its incentive to sue in the first place. The
majority assures us, with no support, that everything will be okay because
the parties can settle by simply negotiating an earlier entry date for the
generic drug manufacturer, rather than settling with money. Ante, at 2246 –
2247 . But it's a matter of common sense, confirmed by experience, that
parties are more likely to settle when they have a broader set of valuable
things to trade.
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V
The majority today departs from the settled approach separating
patent and antitrust law, weakens the protections afforded to innovators by
patents, frustrates the public policy in favor of settling, and likely
undermines the very policy it seeks to promote by forcing generics who step
into the litigation ring to do so without the prospect of cash settlements. I
would keep things as they were and not subject basic questions of patent
law to an unbounded inquiry under antitrust law, with its treble damages
and famously burdensome discovery.... I respectfully dissent.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Interestingly all eight Justices (Justice Alito did not participate) appear
to agree that consumer welfare is the goal of the antitrust laws. That
perspective dominates Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court, but even
Chief Justice Roberts states early in his dissent that “The point of antitrust
law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.” A
strict consumer welfare approach measures antitrust violations by their
impact on consumers, including reduced market output, higher prices, or
reduced innovation. A "total welfare" approach looks at effects on
everyone, including producers. For example, a practice that increases prices
by $1 million but that produces offsetting efficiency gains to producers of
$1.2 million would be lawful under a total welfare approach even though
consumers are injured. The welfare goals of the antitrust laws have been
the subject of an enormous scholarly debate for decades. However, the
courts almost uniformly follow a consumer welfare principle and Actavis is
in line with that tradition. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing
Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L.REV. 2471 (2013).
2. An unanticipated consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to set up
little two-firm cartels between the pioneer patentee and the first generic
entrant. Guaranteed freedom from entry by a third competitor for 180 days
following the generic firm's production, they have a strong incentive to
perpetuate any monopoly the patent (assuming its validity) creates rather
than enter into competition. Further, until Actavis the general rule favored
settlements of patent infringement disputes, even tolerating settlements that
divided markets, as these do. For two firms agreeing with each other, their
joint profit-maximizing output and price is exactly the same as that of a
monopolist, and sharing these monopoly profits is more profitable in nearly
every case than competing. For example, suppose manufacturing costs to
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both parties are 50 cents per unit. The monopoly price is 90 cents per unit.
When the generic enters, if the two firms behave competitively the price
will drop to 50 cents and they will each earn only a competitive return. By
contrast, if they settle via a payment for delayed entry, the two firms will
share the 40 cents in monopoly profits for a time, at consumers’ expense.
The ironic result is that it is more profitable for the generic to settle than
even to win the lawsuit outright, which would make the market competitive.
The parties might of course achieve a similar result if the generic produced
and the two firms colluded on the product price. The statute does not
permit price collusion, however, and as a result it would be per se violation
of the antitrust laws. So the Hatch-Waxman settlement somewhat
resembles the story of two price-fixers who shut down one of their plants
and produce the cartel output from the remaining plant.
Generally speaking, patent settlements are devices for addressing the
risk of a legal outcome that is unfavorable to the pioneer patentee, such as a
finding of invalidity. In the typical infringement case the patentee discounts
the risk of losing the lawsuit into an agreement that typically includes a
license to the infringer to produce under the patent at a specified royalty.
One significant difference between conventional settlements and reverse
payment settlements is that the ordinary settlement is an output increasing
event, making both patentee and licensee into producers. By contrast, a
reverse payment settlement presumptively reduces output by preserving
production only by the pioneer while raising its costs.
In general, pioneer pharmaceutical patents are strong and relatively
durable, preventing far few problems of interpretation and validity than,
say, information technologies patents. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 138-146 (2009).
Most Hatch-Waxman
settlements are not on original pioneer molecules, however. They are
typically on "evergreened" extension patents for new uses, new dosages,
new forms of delivery, and the like. The failure rate of these patents is
much higher, and the incentives to profit from the bilateral monopoly
accordingly greater. Indeed, while the invalidity rate of litigated patents is
an already-too-high 40%, the invalidity rate of pharmaceutical patents
litigated under paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman process is nearly double
that, 73% (FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration (2002),,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. In
Actavis the drug patent was on a particular gel formulation of a drug that
was established and widely available but whose patent had expired. As a

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Ch. 4, Page 99
August 2013

result the formulation may not have met patent law's novelty requirement.
The drug itself was in the public domain, and gel formulations of drugs
have been well known for decades.
3. Consider the range of options open to the Court, ranging from least
to most restrictive:
a. Any settlement, including ones that involve pay-for-delay, is
immune from antitrust attack if it is facially "within the scope of the
patent." For example, if a patent has six years remaining and the payfor-delay exclusion agreement runs only five years, then the payment is
lawful because the patent standing alone would have kept the infringer
out of the market in any event. Under this approach the court may not
second guess the settlement by inquiring into the validity of the patent
or the defendant's actual infringement; the settlement itself shields these
queries from the court, with a possible exception for egregious
situations involving obviously invalid patents. That is, it creates an
"almost unrebuttable presumpton of patent validity," and thus "assumes
away the question being litigated in the underlying patent suit...." In re
K–Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214 (C.A.3 2012) (rejecting "scope
of the patent" approach). This is the approach that many lower courts have

taken, including the Eleventh Circuit decision that the Supreme Court
reversed, and it is consistent with a long tradition of federal judicial
deference to settlements of patent infringement disputes. See 12
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2046 (3d ed. 2012). On the
course taken by earlier decisions, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS,
MARK A. LEMLEY, AND CHRISTOPHER LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST §15.3 (2d
ed. Supp. 2013) Justice Breyer acknowledged a "general legal policy

favoring the settlement of disputes."
b. A settlement payment that seems very large in proportion to
litigation risks is a sign that something is wrong with the patent. It is
likely either invalid or not infringed. This should be construed as an
invitation to open the question that courts traditionally avoid in
challenges to settlements.
They should look more closely at the
underlying patent and the infringement action in order to determine
whether the settlement is really a good faith attempt to manage litigation
and business risk, given the general uncertainty of patent infringement
lawsuit outcomes. Or is this simply an attempt to continue an
unjustified stream of monopoly profits, albeit with two firms sharing it
rather than one? Possibilities for this close look have included direct
judicial evaluation of the patent or perhaps a call for re-examination by
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the USPTO.

See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN
INNOVATION 93-96 (2012) (noting limitations on this approach); Gregory
Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 281 (2011) (defending it).

c. A "large" settlement exclusion payment disproportionate to
litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust's rule of reason, without
inquiry into whether the patent is actually invalid or not infringed, and
even if the settlement agreement does not go "beyond the scope" of the
patent's nominal coverage. The plaintiff has the burden of showing both
market power and competitive harm.
d. Same as c, except a large payment triggers a "quick look," or
truncated, antitrust analysis in which the plaintiff can enjoy
presumptions about market power or anticompetitive effect. The
defendant has the burden of defending against these and showing
offsetting defenses.
e. Pay-for-delay settlements are unlawful per se -- that is, the
plaintiff need prove only that such an agreement exists; power and
anticompetitive effects need not be proven.
The Supreme Court chose option c. Most lower courts had chosen
some version of option a. Although a minority had chosen either d or e.
4. Nevertheless, just how different is the "rule of reason" that Justice
Breyer insisted must apply in this case and the "quick look" that the FTC
had requested? The Supreme Court in general, but Justice Breyer in
particular, has never been a big fan of "quick look" antitrust analysis. The
question of truncated antitrust analysis actually revolves around two issues.
The first is the assignment of burdens of proof, while the second is the
question of what kind of evidence is necessary for the plaintiff to carry its
burden. On the first, the majority rejected the FTC's request that once an
unreasonably large payment was shown the burden shifted to the defendant
to justify it. On the second question, however, the Court also held that
power could be inferred from a very large payment -- indicating that a
relevant market need not be defined and a market share need not be
computed. Second, it held that anticompetitive effects in the form of higher
consumer prices could also be inferred from the high payment. The
defenses that the Court acknowledged were that the payment was no larger
than reasonably anticipated litigation costs, and that the generic was in fact
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contracting to provide services to the pioneer (probably distribution and
marketing) whose fair market value equalled the excess payment. Note that
the one defense that the Court did not acknowledge was that the patent was
valid. In fact, the Court repeatedly stated that patent validity vel non was
not an essential aspect of the antitrust case.
5. Although Justice Breyer did not reach the issue, one important query in
rule of reason cases is whether a less restrictive alternative exists to a
challenged restraint found to pose a significant risk of competitive harm.
Wouldn’t it be a less restrictive alternative for the pioneer patentee and the
generic to enter into an agreement under which the generic paid a license
fee and produced the drug in competition with the patentee? That is a
typical outcome in patent infringement suits and rarely raises competitive
problems. The licensing arrangement adds an additional purchaser. The
more doubtful the validity of the patent, the lower the license fee will be.
Further, license arrangements of this sort – unlike pay-for-delay settlements
– are expressly authorized by the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §261.
6. The majority and dissent disputed whether pay-for-delay settlements are
a unique feature of Hatch-Waxman (majority) or are in fact relatively
common among patent settlements generally (dissent). The question is
important because traditional settlements (generic pays for a license to
produce) are generally procompetitive, and that would make them a less
restrictive alternative. Chief Justice Roberts cited a law review article and
the defendant's brief, which cited some non-Hatch-Waxman cases as
examples of pay-for-delay settlements. None of the cases involved patents.
Two were trademark cases in which the parties settled with reverse
payments in the $150,000 - $300,000 range after the district courts had
denied preliminary injunctions. But $300,000 is very likely less than the
prospective cost of litigation. See MGM, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc.,
183 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1999); Time Prods., Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660
(2d Cir. 1994). The third case was also a trademark case in which
Microsoft made a $20,000,000 exit payment to a firm that produced an open
source computer operating system called "Lindows." (probably a
combination of "Linux" and "Windows"). Microsoft had already lost a
request for a preliminary injunction twice, and the district court had ruled
that a jury should decide whether the name "Windows" was generic, and
thus in the public domain. The United States Patent Trademark Office had
twice held that the name Windows was generic, but then changed its mind
without explanation. In sum, the litigation risk for Windows was not
merely that the defendant could keep the name Lindows, but that the
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Windows name would go into the public domain. $20,000,000 was a small
price to pay.
7. Language in the majority's opinion may carry the Actavis holding
beyond the Hatch-Waxman context. Most importantly is Justice Breyer's
distinction between practices that are authorized by the Patent Act and those
that are not. If a particular provision (1) appears anticompetitive; and (2) is
not authorized by the Patent Act, then the decision may permit an antitrust
challenge even though the patents in question are valid. One good example
is product price fixing in settlement agreements. In the much criticized
decision in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the
Supreme Court approved a license agreement in which patentee GE licensed
Westinghouse to manufacture light bulbs and stipulated the price at which
the bulbs must be sold by Westinghouse's retailers. Justice Breyer read the
decision very narrowly, stating that it "permitted a single patentee to grant
to a single licensee a license containing a minimum resale price
requirement." Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2232. This limitation to a single
licensor and a single licensee very likely overrules decisions such as E.
Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), which
permitted all the firms making a product to cross-license their patents and
stipulate the resale price of the product.
8. Under ordinary antitrust rules, both the pioneer patentee and the generic
could be held liable in damages for an unlawful pay-for-delay settlement.
While the antitrust laws offer some relief for "coerced" participants in a
conspiracy (such as dealers upon whom tying arrangements or unlawful
resale price maintenance are imposed), the generic company in these cases
is hardly coerced. It is a willing participant very likely in a position to earn
more under the settlement than it could be entering into competitive
production. Consumer damages in private actions would ordinarily be
measured by the overcharge, and under the ordinary antitrust rules of joint
and several liability, both defendants would individually and together be
liable for the damage award. Under federal antitrust law "indirect"
purchasers could not collect damages, although they could obtain an
injunction. Since most pharmaceutical drugs are distributed through
pharmacies and other health care suppliers, consumers would be indirect
purchasers. So in these cases the pharmacies and other direct purchasers
could sue for damages, but not consumers. However, the antitrust law of
many states permits indirect purchasers to claim damages. See 2A PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶346, 395 (4th ed.
2014).
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NOTE
PATENT VS. TRADEMARK SETTLEMENTS
In Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997),
the court approved a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit
involving the brand names “Lysol” and “Pine-Sol.” Lysol was the senior
mark, antedating Pine-Sol (at the time called “Pinesol”) by several decades.
When the owners of Pinesol, who were sellers of household chemicals,
attempted to register the mark the examiner in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office denied registration, concluding that there was a similarity
between the “Pi” sound in Pinesol and the “Ly” sound in Lysol that could
confuse customers. When the owners of Pinesol continued to use it without
registration, the owner of Lysol sued for trademark infringement.
The parties entered a settlement agreement under which the owners
of Pinesol agreed to use that name only in chemicals that had pine oil as an
active ingredient, to use a distinctive picture of an evergreen tree on the
label, and to change the name of their products to “Pine-Sol,” thus keeping
the “Pine” and the “Sol” separate. More than fifteen years later a new
dispute arose when the owners of the revised Pine-Sol mark began to use it
on aerosol spray disinfectants, which competed directly with Lysol
products. The parties revised their agreement but controversy continued to
erupt as Pine-Sol added new products to its line.
Clorox, the subsequent owner of Pine-Sol finally brought an action
in 1987, alleging that the product agreement in the settlement agreement no
longer served a useful purpose because the distinctiveness of the two labels
was clearly established in consumers’ minds. As a result the settlement
agreement was nothing more than a naked market division agreement, per
se unlawful under the antitrust laws.
The court held that the agreement remained enforceable. The
agreement did not restrict either party from making any product but only
from using a particular name on that product:
The trademark agreement at issue here does no more than
regulate how the name PINE-SOL may be used; it does not in any
way restrict Clorox from producing and selling products that
compete directly with the LYSOL brand, so long as they are
marketed under a brand name other than PINE-SOL. Accordingly, at
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first blush it would not appear to restrict Clorox's, much less any
other competitor's, ability to compete in the markets LYSOL
products allegedly dominate.
The court rejected Clorox’s “megabrand” theory – namely, that certain
trademarks are so attractive and well recognized in the eyes of customers
that they confer significant advantages over those making similar products
but not having the same market. Further,
… there is no evidence to support the theory that only Clorox is
capable of competing against LYSOL products in the alleged
markets LYSOL dominates. The overall household cleaning
industry is the battleground of some of the largest corporations in
the country, wielding numerous megabrands. The industry is made
up of firms with the resources to develop new products and market
them, as these companies have repeatedly done. In the past, these
companies regularly bought and sold trademarks, as this case
illustrates, as changing economic conditions dictated. See id. at 26.
Each of these major corporations, like Clorox, has significant
goodwill attached to its own name, and to the trademarks it owns.
… Nothing here suggests that the other large companies that
produce cleaning products are incapable of successfully investing
their resources, in the form of capital and brand name equity, to
enter the markets LYSOL products allegedly dominate. Clorox has
presented no evidence to the contrary.
Note the important differences between a trademark settlement and a
patent settlement. First, a trademark settlement with a product division
agreement excludes only from the brand name, not from the product itself.
As a result, new product entry by both the settlement party and by others is
unrestricted. By contrast, a patent settlement excludes from the technology
covered by the patent(s) in dispute, which in some cases may involve the
ability to manufacture the product itself. For example, in pharmaceutical
settlements such as the one in the principal case the patents in question may
cover the “molecule,” or the entire product, and may effectively perpetuate
a monopoly in the pioneer patentee. On the other side, the patent settlement
excludes only for the duration of the patent. Once it has expired others are
free to make and market the formerly patented product. By contrast, a
trademark is of indefinite duration.

